POPREBEL

Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe

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Keywords

Populism, concepts

Definitions and acronyms

Acronym	Definition
POPREBEL	Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism

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1. Introduction

The glossary of basic concepts for Work Package 3 – Culture (D 3.1) is a collection of twenty-seven entries, which the researchers in the package consider to be crucial for the understanding of the phenomena and processes that will be the subject of their studies within WP3. The goal of such a collection is to provide a common platform of understanding for researchers working across disciplines, topics, methods and country contexts. Work Package 3 is the largest WP in the POPREBEL project, as it is composed of nine very different tasks. It includes researchers from five different universities: Jagiellonian University in Krakow (WP leader), the University of Belgrade, Charles University in Prague, University College London and the University of Tartu. Among them are anthropologists, cultural studies scholars, historians, political studies scholars and sociologists, performing qualitative research on various country-cases in order to identify important phenomena illustrating both the demand and the supply aspects of the rise of populism in the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

Among those aspects are issues pertaining to underlying conditions that may provide fertile ground for populist discourses: traditionalism, the search for mental security and for a specific positioning on mental maps as well as fear of change, fear of Otherness and scepticism towards Europe and the EU. Some tasks focus on the specific channels through which demand for and supply of populist politics is expressed: the Internet, the traditional and new media and popular culture. Many tasks analyse the processes related to identity construction and negotiation: for instance, ethnic/national identities, gender identities, sexual identities, migrant identities. Finally, some tasks scrutinise the various narratives of populists in government and of the populist radical right: their appeal to the people and to sovereignty, the use of nativism, politics of memory and mythologisation as well as discourses of othering and victimisation. The concepts presented in the glossary show how POPREBEL scholars understand them in light of their planned research, although they do not attempt to illustrate the entire state-of-the art on a given topic. The selection of concepts was made based on three assumptions: 1) the concepts that are key to specific research projects within WP3; 2) the concepts that are understood differently or in a more narrow way than in the general academic discourse; 3) the concepts that are ambiguous or imprecise and need defining. Teams from all five universities contributed to the glossary and the discussion on the selection and review process was a collective effort under the guidance of Professor Zdzisław Mach, the Scientist-in-Charge of the WP leader, Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

The concepts in the glossary thus form the basis for further research on and interpretation of cultural phenomena that can be observed in the wider region of Central and Eastern Europe. Given the variety of cultural contexts as well as methodological approaches, the empirical research results may not be comparable from country to country but the knowledge gathered through these qualitative studies will provide new insights for the understanding of the concepts presented in the glossary. The main objective of the glossary is to provide a theoretical frame of reference for WP3 researchers. However, after the research results in WP3 are obtained, the empirical knowledge will provide new ways of critically addressing these concepts. Then, the WP3 researchers will aim to publish the glossary for use by the academic community and the wider public, potentially also including key concepts relating to the work of colleagues from other POPREBEL Work Packages.

2. Concepts

Conspiracy theory

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Conspiracy theory can be simply defined as a conviction that a secret, omnipotent individual or group covertly controls the political and social order or some part thereof (Fenster, 2008, p. 1). The concept of conspiracy theory is similar to the notion of rumour, as it broadly represents claims that fail to meet standards of evidence widely agreed upon.

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However, whereas rumours can be defined as 'unverified and instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat and that function to help people make sense [of] and manage risk', conspiracy theories refer to claims that seek 'to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role' (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Based on this reasoning, Mark Fenster described conspiracy theory as a populist theory of power (Fenster, 2008).

Conspiracy theories can easily be found all over the world. In a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries, 78 percent of respondents said that they do not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs (Schmid, 2017). Around one third of US and Canadian citizens believe that the 9/11 attacks were organised by the US. In China, a bestseller attributes various events (the rise of Hitler, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and environmental destruction in the developing world) to the Rothschild banking dynasty; the analysis has been read and debated at high levels of business and government, and it appears to have had an effect on discussions about currency policies (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Conspiracy theories are not necessarily wrong. In fact, as the cases of Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair illustrate, small groups of powerful individuals do occasionally seek to affect the course of history (Keeley, 1999, p. 11).

It is difficult to pinpoint a singular group or groups that are more prone to accepting conspiracy theories. Generally, the studies have shown that people who believe in one conspiracy are more likely to also believe in others. A seminal study by Goertzel (1994) showed a correlation between belief in conspiracies and anomia, lack of interpersonal trust, and insecurity about employment, but there were few significant correlations with gender, educational level or occupational category.

Conspiracy theory has been a popular subject of academic enquiry since the last decade of the 20th century. Sunstein and Vermeule argue that most of the academic literature directly involving conspiracy theories falls into one of two classes: (1) work by analytic philosophers, especially in epistemology and the philosophy of science, that explores a range of issues but mainly asks what counts as a 'conspiracy theory' and whether such theories are methodologically suspect; and (2) a work in sociology and Freudian psychology on the causes of conspiracy theorising (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).

Conspiracy theories research is very relevant for the studies of populism. Conspiracies proliferate in an environment where there is 'the extreme – indeed, ultimate – scepticism of the political sphere by a sector of the population that feels excluded' (Fenster, 2008, p. 71). According to the same author, believing in conspiracies requires the conviction that the only thing politicians can do is be deceptive and plot secret plans for a global takeover (Ibid). Such a cynical and dissatisfied view of political institutions and their functioning is also associated with preference for populist parties (Doyle, 2011). In fact, such parties often use a conspiratorial tone to describe their opponents (Hawkins, 2009) and, in broader terms, their discourse is often described as 'conspiracist' (Vossen, 2010). The worldviews of conspiracy theories and populism are very similar. They both present (or demand) simple narratives with two well-defined sides, separated on moral grounds. They see conspirators controlling society, with more resources and willpower, and ordinary people as their victims. Moreover, they both seem to be rooted in general animosity toward anything official. (Castanho Silva et al., 2017, p. 427).

In the POPREBEL project, the conspiracist narrative will be taken as a strong indicator of populism in politics. Political actors' (parties and individuals) discourses in both traditional and the new media as well as in the promotional materials will be analysed for presence of conspiracist topics and motives.

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Cultural Marxism

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Cultural Marxism traces its ideological origins in the thought of the Frankfurt School and Antonio Gramsci (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1951; Forgacs, 2000). From a theoretical angle, Cultural Marxism, especially as epitomised by the Frankfurt School, can be schematically conceptualised as an ideological current which combines selected elements from the thought of Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Sigmund Freud and Max Weber (Held, 1980). As part of the endeavour to fill in certain omissions of 19th-century classical Marxism, the Frankfurt School further added a considerable stress on the methodological approaches applied by currents such as existentialism and psychoanalysis (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009).

Alongside class hierarchy, Cultural Marxism places equal emphasis on complementary power structures, such as gender, sexuality and race/ethnicity. In greater detail, without understating the centrality of class struggle, the representatives of this ideological current contend that the struggle for class equality must coincide, as a historical process, with the materialisation of gender equality and the combat against the stigmatisation of marginalised groups within society. Especially the latter objective emerged as an urgent necessity following the rise of Fascism and Nazism, during the interwar era, and the historical experience of the Holocaust during the Second World War (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1951). For the purposes of this entry, the lens is primarily cast on the systematic recasting and/or misinterpretation of Cultural Marxism in the discourses of the populist and radical right (PRR) – namely, the endeavour to portray thematic areas such as feminism, the international LGBTQI rights movement as well as the implementation of multicultural policies as tangible manifestations of a 'global project' built upon the ideological premises of Cultural Marxism.

Cas Mudde (2018) addresses a crucial aspect in the literature as to what motivates voters to opt for PRR parties – namely, the part played by economic anxieties. He contends that voters of PRR parties show their support at the ballot box in response to neoliberal globalisation (Mudde, 2019). This target group is also known as the 'losers of globalization', or the losers in economic modernisation theory (Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2019). In Central and Eastern Europe, a similar concept exists and is known as the 'losers of the transition', which produced both winners and losers of the transition process after the collapse of state Socialism (Mudde, 2007; Minkenberg, 2015 and 2017). Within both contexts, this can be expanded to a mutual sentiment of alienation from the elites, one which is widely known as a protest vote (Eatwell, 2000)

Yet, Ignazi (1992) made an early claim that, in addition to socioeconomic anxieties, the then 'new' PRR parties represented an embodiment of a silent and global counter-revolution against post-materialism and the New Left (Ignazi, 1992; Arzheimer, 2018). Amidst the context of the economic and migration crises, the current political climate in Europe (and beyond) hints at the persistence of ideological cleavages. The PRR has responded to and also driven these

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cleavages and so has the New Left. The latter has championed political positions which concentrate on socioeconomic issues and, at the same time, promote sociocultural equality (Bornschier, 2018). Bornschier, (2018) and also emphasise the non-economic cleavages which the PRR has addressed. This includes the systematic recasting and misinterpretation of Cultural Marxism which is employed as a catchphrase by the PRR, as well as the far-right non-party sector, to encompass all stances perceived as liberal or left-wing on debates of a sociocultural character (e.g. minority and LGBTQ rights as well as multiculturalism – broadly defined).

In line with Mudde (2007 and 2019), nativism, which is the host ideology of the PRR party-family, maintains that any non-native or 'alien' elements are potentially detrimental to the integrity of the titular nation. Nativism addresses ideological currents, as well as groups of people (on bio-political grounds) and individuals. If populism, nativism and authoritarianism make up the ideological cornerstone of the PRR party family, Cultural Marxism is the polar opposite. This renders opposition to 'Cultural Marxism' a key-theme for the PRR's alleged rebellion against modernity and/or the acculturation project, which is allegedly sponsored by the 'global elite' (e.g. in the educational system(s) and the media).

Although opposition to socially liberal (or left-wing) stances, such as same-sex partnerships or the enhanced role of women in politics and society, forms a commonplace theme, the radical right can also be situationally adaptive (Arzheimer, 2018). There have been examples of PRR parties being led by openly gay party-leaders or chairs, who claim to defend European secular values against Islam by arguing that the two are non-compatible. However, such instances are largely confined to PRR parties in Western Europe (e.g. the cases of the Netherlands and Denmark). The perceived threat of Cultural Marxism is a key-theme, named verbatim, in the text of the *Bauska Declaration* (signed jointly by the Estonian Conservative People's Party, Latvia's National Alliance, and their Lithuanian partners in 2013).

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Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe

Cultural populism

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Cultural populism is not a rigorous analytical category. Social scientists and cultural critics addressed the issue from the standpoint of histories of cultural populism (Ryle, 1996) rather than from a single conceptual angle. Since populism is not only an economic-political programme but also a 'cultural mission', the concept of 'cultural populism' should be scrutinised in the framework of the 'emotional backlash' (Galston, 2018) against the elites. Starting with Richard Hofstadter's Pulitzer prize-winning book *Age of Reform* (Hofstadter, 1955) – where populism is framed as a 'provincial' and 'folkloric' form of politics – the concept of 'cultural populism' was employed in academic literature as an umbrella term, denoting a variety of cultural practices, behaviours, speeches and products that displayed political demagogy. Often, the employment of the term 'cultural populism' was reserved to pejorative usages both in academia and beyond. Against these common-sensical, negative connotations, cultural theorist and sociologist Jim McGuigan defined 'cultural populism' neutrally. According to his view, 'cultural populism' is a descriptive term that came to denote the analysis of cultural discourses that reflect upon the various combinations and meanings of the two separate terms: 'culture' and 'populism'. McGuigan's theorises 'cultural populism' as 'the intellectual assumption made by some students of popular culture, that the symbolic experiences and practices of ordinary people are more important analytically and politically than Culture with capital C.' (McGuigan, 1992, p. 4). Thus, in order to understand 'cultural populism', cultural studies must re-evaluate 'the popular' in the concept of 'popular culture'.

Ryle posits that intellectuals' encounters with popular culture 'have carried implicit, and sometimes unacknowledged, personal and cultural meanings' (Ryle, 1996). In this light, popular culture is rather embraced by them, not dismissed. By the same token, the re-evaluation of the popular is what Ryle calls 'a new self-positioning of intellectuals: vis-à-vis the popular 'other' against which they find themselves placed within an economically and culturally divided society'. (Ryle, 1996). As McGuigan admitted, 'cultural populism is not a unitary phenomenon' (McGuigan, 1992, p. 5). Therefore, cultural populism can be understood in a variety of ways. One of the common understandings refers to cultural practice formats that seek 'to constitute the people often around a frontier of polarization' (Palonen, 2018, 237) that sets the border between 'us' versus 'them' and 'friends' versus 'enemies'. Hence, cultural populism can work both ways: either as the culture of 'the People' that articulates disdain for the elites' taste and values, or as the culture of the elites that try to persuade the people that their values are worth pursuing. In both instances, the emphasis is put of 'values'.

An inverted format of cultural populism reveals that it is not always the culture of the people that displays the disdain in the elites' taste and values, but rather the elites are mainstreaming high culture to the people with nationalist arguments. To mention just one example of an inverted format of cultural populism, one can scrutinise the 2016 national campaign that aimed to persuade Romanians to donate 6 million euros to 'save' modernist sculptor Constantin Brancusi's *Wisdom of the Earth* from becoming an artwork indexed in a private collection. The media campaign's strategy rested on the cultural elites trying to convince 'the people' that 'Brancusi is theirs', exactly like 'Romania is theirs' (this was one of the campaign notorious slogans propounded by Romanian actors, philosophers, musicians, etc.). Thus, what these campaigns reveal is not the culture of the people that displays disdain in the elites' values – as cultural populism is customarily understood – but rather the cultural elites that are attempting to mainstream high culture (e.g. Brancusi's high modernism) to the people through nationalistic rhetoric. Thus, the discursive construction of 'the people' is not necessarily directed against the 'elites' but against an enemy, that impersonates 'the other' of the national culture and ethos. Within the POPREBEL's tasks, we will explore both understandings of cultural populism.

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Ethno-nationalism

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Ethno-nationalism is embedded into the key concept of *ethnos* or *ethnie*. An *ethnie* can be defined as: 'a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historic memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland and some degree of solidarity, at least among some of its members' (Smith, 1999, p. 13). Through its association with ancestral myths and symbols, ethno-nationalism possesses a powerful socio-psychological component which is crucial for mass mobilisation (Connor, 1993; Billig, 1995). The ethno-nationalist approach tends to perceive *ethnos/ethnie* as a historically evolved and externally demarcated cultural community, and, only to a secondary extent, as a biological or political collectivity. Inside this mode of interpretation, the ethno-cultural community per se becomes the ultimate source of political mobilisation and legitimacy (Conversi, 1999).

The primary objective of ancestral myths – that are often central in constructing a cultural community – is to generate an overriding commitment and bond for the group. The most powerful ancestral myths are those referring to the linear continuity of the group through the ages. These myths acquire a poetic and mystical dimension when associated with an ancestral or 'sacred territory' (e.g. Kosovo and its symbolism in Serbian nationalism) - hence the importance attached to 'sacred territories' in all types of nationalist imagery. 'Sacred territories' are constructed via a mytho-poetic narrative: these are the territories where the group flourished during its 'golden age' and which must be defended by all means and at all costs. All myths of group-descent have as a focal point of reference an older 'golden age' (e.g. Periclean Athens in Modern Greek nationalism), which serves, or must serve, as the model for the regeneration of the community.

Cultural-ideological myths of descent stress the persistence of certain types of collective virtue (e.g. the 'heroic spirit') or other distinct cultural qualities such as language, religion and customs through the ages. By locating the present (or, occasionally, the future) inside the context of the past of the group, ancestral myths interpret social changes and collective aspirations in a way that satisfies the drive for meaning, by making up new identities that also seem to be very old. Ancestral myths are espoused through state rituals even in states with a pronounced 'civic' character (e.g. United Kingdom and the United States) or, nominally, Communist states (e.g. China) (Mach, 1989; Smolicz, 1998). Their mobilising potential revolves around the very fact that they pertain to the non-rational domain of the 'nation'. Ancestral myths endow the nation with a near universality through the employment of selected images and phrases (e.g. home, forefathers, brothers and mother) that aim at forging a subconscious bond of integrity among its members. This is of vital importance for political mobilisation because, as Walker Connor phrases it, 'people do not voluntarily die for things that are rational' (Connor, 1993, p. 206).

As part of this process the political engineering by parties and/or other organisations which claim to speak in the name of an *ethnie* is of paramount significance. Within certain contexts, the mobilising potential of ethno-nationalism can become subject to regional geopolitics and the triadic intersection among ethnic minorities, the state where they reside, and the kin-state (or 'external homeland') of the minority group (e.g. the case of the ethnic Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia as well as the conflicts throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s) (Brubaker, 1995; Smith, 2002).

Ethno-nationalism is highly topical for the study of the populist and radical right because, alongside populism and anti-establishment rhetoric, the host ideology of this party-family is nativism that is best defined as a specific version of

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ethno-nationalism (Guia 2016; Rydgren, 2017). This concept acquires a greater significance when viewed inside the context of the Baltic States where independent statehood has been largely interpreted within the frames of 'restoration' and 'decolonisation' nationalism (Annus, 2012; Peiker, 2016) and the model of 'ethnic democracy' (Smooha, 2001) has been implemented with the objective to manage the relations between the titular (national) majorities and the ethnic Russian minorities - namely, the cases of Estonia and Latvia. Wierenga (2017) and Braghiroli & Petsinis (2019) have observed that immigration and the variable of a new, ethnic 'other' potentially challenges the dynamic of how ethnic Russians are considered by Estonian and Latvian ethno-nationalists. However, the politicisation of the ethno-cultural divide, in combination with an emphasis on the securitisation of the bilateral relations between Estonia/Latvia and Russia, remains highly relevant for the Baltic populist and radical right especially in Latvia.

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Euroscepticism

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Schematically defined, Euroscepticism is the: 'outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). According to Taggart and Szczerbiak, Euroscepticism can be internally delineated between 'hard' and 'soft'. Hard Euroscepticism consists of the principled opposition to the EU and may even demand the withdrawal of given states from the EU or object to their prospects of EU membership (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). Soft Euroscepticism does not entail the principled opposition to the EU but focuses on policy areas where a divergence between the 'national interest' and the EU trajectory is perceived (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). All manifestations of Euroscepticism can be articulated both on the party-based and the public (or grassroot) levels – inside and outside the EU.

The Euroscepticism of political parties is dependent upon ideology, political and socioeconomic circumstances and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy (Topaloff, 2017). Therefore, the engagement of Eurosceptic parties can be subject to malleability and/or 'situational adaptability'. Within this context, Kopecky and Mudde further diversify the dichotomy between hard and soft Euroscepticism. The authors argue that Eurosceptic parties tend to adopt softer stances and do not oppose the idea of European integration per se. However, they object, to varying degrees, to its materialisation. It is the 'Euro-reject' parties that assume harder stances and oppose both the idea and the materialisation (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).

Flood proposes an analytical classification of party-based Euroscepticism which comprises the revisionist, reformist, gradualist, maximalist, minimalist, and rejectionist categories (Flood, 2002). The revisionist category opts for a return to the state of affairs prior to a major EU treaty/decision whereas the reformist desires the modification of one or more existing EU institutions and/or practices. Gradualist Eurosceptics formally endorse the European integration process albeit at a slower pace and with greater care. Maximalists are in favour of pushing forward with the existing process as rapidly as is practicable towards higher levels of integration whereas minimalists tend to accept the status quo but resist further integration. Lastly, rejectionist parties adamantly oppose participation in the EU or any of its constituent institutions. Inside this mode of interpretation, the dominant brands of Euroscepticism among the proponents of Brexit within the ranks of the British Conservatives and smaller political actors (e.g. Brexit Party, UKIP) can be positioned somewhere along the trajectory between a rejectionist and a maximalist stance – one that opts for a withdrawal from the EU with the fewest losses and the greatest gains possible (Leruth, Startin and Usherwood, 2017).

Euroscepticism is a highly topical concept for the study of left-wing as well as right-wing populism. Especially following the toll of the recent economic crisis across Southern Europe, left-wing Eurosceptics tend to scrutinise European integration as a project which is embedded in the neoliberal principles of globalised capitalism (Della Porta, 2017). Meanwhile, two areas of utmost significance for right-wing Eurosceptics across Europe are: (a) varying degrees of opposition to immigration and insistence on the principle of hard borders (Evans and Mellon, 2019); (b) safeguarding national sovereignty from the 'domination of Brussels' (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017).

In Central and Eastern Europe, as early as the 1990s, a series of (usually right-wing) parties started formulating their nascent Euroscepticism along the lines of a conceptualisation that the EU 'imposes' minority rights from the exterior and weakens national sovereignty (e.g. the cases of Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia) (Bustikova 2018). Following the outbreak of the migration crisis (2015), the brands of Euroscepticism among certain conservative right-wing parties across this region (e.g. FIDESZ in Hungary and PiS in Poland) have undergone a qualitative transformation; they are no longer focused on negotiating a compromise over the terms of a state's membership of the EU but, rather, harbour ambitions to revise the EU's configurations (at least in regard to selected policy areas) and reform its existing institutions and practices from within (Palonen, 2018; Kovacs and Scheppele, 2018).

In Estonia and Latvia, varying shades of Euroscepticism make up components of the political platforms espoused by the radical right (EKRE and National Alliance) as well as populist parties with a 'broader' anti-establishment orientation (Who Owns the State?/KPV). There are three dimensions of this Euroscepticism: geopolitical, economic and sociocultural (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019; Petsinis, 2019). The geopolitical scrutinises the degree to which Estonia's and Latvia's membership of the EU enhances the security status of these two states vis-à-vis Russia. The economic contests institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and objects to the purchase of Estonian/Latvian land and natural resources by foreign entrepreneurs. The sociocultural dimension revolves around opposition to the EU's quota arrangement for refugees as well as the EU's guidelines for LGBTQ rights.

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Fake news

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The authenticity of information has become a longstanding issue affecting society, both in the context of printed and digital media. The phenomenon of fake news has been addressed by scholars from various backgrounds – psychology (what makes fake news attractive, why do people believe it), sociology (what environment is suitable for proliferation of fake news), political science (who are the actors and what are their political agendas) but also computing (what

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technical solutions can be used to tackle dissemination of fake news) and journalism (how to differentiate fake from 'real' news).

There have been many attempts to define fake news. First of all, fake news can be conceptualised as distorted signals uncorrelated with the truth (Allcot & Gentzkow 2017, p. 213). Another useful definition: a deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims as news, where these are misleading by design (Gelfert, 2018). Edson et al. (2018) who reviewed how the term 'fake news' was defined and operationalised in scholarly articles, concluded that the definitions were based on levels of facticity and deception, ranging from satire to propaganda. This term applies to news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead readers. Fake news can be related to many topics (health, politics, finances) and cause real harm by going 'viral' on social media – from dangerous health decisions and manipulations of the stock market to influencing the results of elections. According to Allcott and Gentzkow, fake news may generate utility for some consumers but may also impose private and social costs by making it more difficult for consumers to infer the true state of the world – for example, for voters to infer which electoral candidate they prefer. Some analysts have characterised fake news as a major global risk (Allcot & Gentzkow, 2017).

In common with classic studies on misleading information dealing with rumours, propaganda and conspiracy theories (Allport and Postman, 1946; Lasswell, 1927; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009), these most recent attempts to define 'fake news' seek to differentiate between specific forms of the phenomenon with reference to the source's intent to deceive (disinformation) versus the honest mistakes, negligence or unconscious biases (misinformation) (Fallis, 2015; Floridi, 2011).

While fake news is not a new phenomenon, it is undoubtedly of growing importance, mostly due to lower barriers of entry in New Media. Social media are particularly suited for fake news dissemination, thanks to the low cost of producing fraudulent websites and the enormous number of software-controlled profiles or pages, known as social bots (Martens et al., 2018). In addition, Gallup polls reveal a continuing decline of 'trust and confidence' in the mass media, which can be observed both as a cause and a consequence of the increased importance of fake news (Brenan, 2019). The last factor that contributes to the prevalence of fake news is the rise of political polarisation and the growth of negative feelings that each side of political spectrum or rival political parties hold toward each other; hence each side is more likely to believe the negative news about the other (Tucker et al., 2018). Creators of fake news are motivated either by the financial benefits or ideological reasons.

Dissemination and influence of fake news tends to be particularly prominent among the older, less technically-savvy and less educated population, as existing studies show. For instance, Guess et al. found a strong age effect among the disseminators of fake news on Facebook. According to them, on average, users over 65 shared nearly seven times as many articles from fake news domains as the youngest age group (Guess et al., 2019). Interestingly, findings of a recent paper by Allcott et al, indicate that the presence of fake news on some social media (on Facebook, but not on Twitter) may have passed its peak reached in 2016, at least in the USA (Allcott et al., 2019).

A new perspective in studying fake news oriented not only towards creators, but also towards propagators or disseminators, was proposed by Giglietto et al. (2019), driven by the existence and the logic of the 'hybrid news system'. In 'hybrid news systems', judgments regarding the falsehood and motivations of propagators (the actors who share fake news) can easily be different from the motivations of the original creator. Such patterns mean that what happens after the 'generative act' of a piece of false news is crucial to the study of real-world cases. The radical change of perspective required by the hybrid news system thus consists of a shift from exclusive attention to producers of fake news to a broader approach that also focuses on propagators and, as a result, on the dynamic and diverse processes that characterise the dissemination of problematic information through multiple chains of propagation (Giglietto et al., 2019).

In addition, the term 'fake news' has been effectively weaponized by political actors to discredit some news organisations' critical reporting attack a variety of news media (e.g. Caplan et al., 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018; Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018). With this in mind, Egelhofer & Lecheler suggest that the term 'fake news' can refer to two dimensions of public communication: the fake news genre (i.e. the deliberate creation of pseudo-journalistic disinformation) and the fake news label, i.e. the instrumentalisation of the term to delegitimise news media (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019, p. 97).

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New media challenge the top-down gatekeeping control of political communication of the traditional media. Social media give the populist actors the freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages (Engesser et al., 2017). Fake news disseminated on social media can serve the purpose of 'revealing the hidden truths' about the elites, especially during the election campaign. For instance, pro-Brexit figures in the UK and Donald Trump in the US used a plethora of fake news during their respective campaigns (Williamson, 2016).

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Gender ideology

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Initially used by Gender Studies scholars to describe the structures of power based on traditional gender norms which define appropriate forms of masculinity and femininity to condition and constrain the behaviour of men and women (see Durest-Lahti, 2008), 'gender ideology' has since been taken up by activists against the very same Gender Studies scholars to refer to any attempts to define sexuality and gender outside the narrow confines of **heteronormativity**. The re-appropriation of 'gender ideology' emerged as a result of the Vatican's opposition to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights discussed at the 1994 United Nations conference on population and development in Cairo and the 1995 Beijing conference on women. The Vatican feared that these rights 'would become a vehicle for the international recognition of abortion, attacks on traditional motherhood and a legitimisation of homosexuality' (Kuhar & Paternotte, 2017, p. 9). Despite its Catholic provenance, anti-gender-ideology rhetoric has spread to encompass both the religious and secular, with anti-gender activists coming from both the right and left, united only by their opposition to what they see as attacks on traditional family values. As Kuhar and Paternotte (2017) explain, 'gender ideology' is an empty signifier, which taps into various fears and anxieties and can thus be shaped to fit a range of political projects.

While anti-gender-ideology activists are found across the political spectrum, in Central and Eastern Europe opposition to 'gender ideology' is most closely associated with right-wing populists. As support for the concept of 'gender' (in its original academic definition) and for recognition of sexual and reproductive rights comes primarily from international organisations such as the United Nations, it is easy for populists to construct an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy, whereby international elites are forcing their corrupt ideas about 'gender' on the powerless national communities below. To emphasise the alien-ness of 'gender', it is rarely translated into local languages but usually left in English.

When instrumentalised by populist governments, as is the case in Poland and Russia, for example, 'gender ideology' is an effective means to consolidate state power by entrenching traditional values in the face of the spread of Western liberal ideas, thereby delegitimising actual and potential opponents and shoring up support among the conservative majority. In addition, scapegoating sexual minorities allows populist politicians to use homosexuality as a lightning rod to divert attention from political corruption and/or the weakening economy.

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Gender regime

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A gender regime represents the totality of the structural relations between men and women, masculinity and femininity, in a specific institutional and/or subcultural context, on the level of both discourse and practice. It thereby defines the social position and obligations of an individual based on her/his belonging to particular gender group and on the content of the gender role. This structuration is externalised in different gender roles, different gender identities and different gender representations (including different gender performances) (Blagojevic, 2002, p. 17).

Gender relations are present in all types of structures of human relations and 'the state of play' of these relations in particular social context represents the latter's gender regime (Connell, 1987, p. 120). The relations between different gender regimes make the gender order. In some cases, these relations are additional or complementary[1] but the gender regimes of interacting institutions/social contexts are rarely so harmonious (Connell, 1987, pp. 134-135).[2]

The concept of gender regime is created in accordance with the acknowledgement of the asymmetrical position of masculinities and femininities in a patriarchal gender order, and the idea of gender as a relational concept. Research to date shows that women are central in many of the processes constructing masculinities, for example as: mothers, schoolmates, girlfriends, sexual partners, wives, workers in the gender division of labour, etc. The same is true the other way around. But it is important to stress that in spite of the fact that both concepts of emphasised femininity and hegemonic masculinity were originally focused on compliance with patriarchy, and this is still highly relevant in contemporary mass culture, for example, contemporary gender hierarchies are also affected by new configurations of women's and men's identities and practices, especially among younger women and men. These alternative identities create multiple practices of masculinity and femininity that reshape the coordinates of contemporary gender regimes that could, through the historical interplay of multiple constructs of femininities and masculinities, influence the future redesign of the global (albeit still predominantly patriarchal) gender order.

The aim of the POPREBEL project is to analyse the shifts in the existing subcultural gender regimes and gender order that are the result of the populist political discourses and actions in concrete historical and societal circumstances.

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[1] As in the case of patterns of recruitment of married women for part-time jobs, particularly as this developed in the 1970s and 1980s, in the economic context of the recession. This case represents a practical accommodation between the institutions involved, as mentioned by Connell.

[2] For example, the conflict between the emotional relationships of the family and the demands of a state at war.

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Hegemonic masculinity

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The concept of hegemonic masculinity, developed by Raewyn Connell, represents a male gender role that occupies the hegemonic position within a particular gender order the content of which changes in relation to the specific socio-cultural framework and to the time in which it is formulated. It is a specific configuration of gender practices, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women and thereby legitimises patriarchy (Connell, 1995, p. 77).

Hegemonic masculinity can be distinguished from other masculinities, especially those which are subordinated. It is important to emphasise that the concept of hegemonic masculinity is not assumed to represent the norm in the statistical sense, because only a minority of men might identify with or perform it. Rather, it is a normative notion. It embodies the currently most privileged form of masculinity, requiring other men to position themselves in relation to it and ideologically legitimating the global gender order that is based on the subordination of women to men. Hegemonic masculinity is not a fixed character type, always and everywhere the same. It is rather a position that is constantly endangered. According to Connell's research different masculinities are differentiated from one another in relation to the discourse which determines them and in relation to the discourses which they themselves constitute. In other words, different social contexts support the creation and promotion of different types of hegemonic masculinities. Depending on the actual/current social context, certain patterns of values and ensuing types of masculinities will impose themselves as hegemonic. Hegemony does not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it means dominance achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion.

In POPREBEL project the main research focus will, on the one hand, be on the different gender identities that are constructed within Serbian society and particular subcultural circles in it and, on the other, their relation to constructs of hegemonic masculinity and its counterpart notion of emphasised femininity frequently used in populist political discourses.

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Heteronormativity/homonormativity

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Coined by Michael Warner in 1991, heteronormativity is the belief that heterosexuality, based on biological essentialism and the alignment of binary sex and gender, is the only acceptable sexual orientation. So pervasive that it is effectively invisible, heteronormativity operates as a structure of power in that, by defining heterosexuality as the norm against which other sexual orientations are judged, it creates hierarchies between 'good' and 'bad' sexualities, gender

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identities and sexual behaviours and legitimises discrimination and, in extreme cases, violence against those who act outside of the heterosexual norm.

Related to **homonationalism**, homonormativity is the belief that only specific types of non-normative sexual and gender subjectivities – predominantly, white, middle-class, straight-acting and cis-gendered – are acceptable, not only to the heterosexual majority but also within the LGBT community. Linking homonormativity to neoliberalism, Lisa Duggan defines it as a 'politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption' (2002, p. 179). Homonormativity can thus often result in prejudice within the LGBT community towards effeminate men, trans* men and women and LGBT people of colour, among others.

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Homonationalism

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Coined by Jasbir Puar (2007), homonationalism is the nationalist co-optation of sexual diversity. In this sense, it can refer to a number of related but distinct phenomena. Firstly, at the level of international politics, it highlights how 'lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity', creating moral hierarchies vis-à-vis national, racial and religious Others and justifying policy action against them (Puar, 2013: 25). In the 2016 US presidential campaigns both candidates used the terrorist attack against the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, to justify military intervention in the Middle East and to restrict migration from Muslim-majority countries, despite the fact that the shooter was US-born (Meyer, 2019). With reference to the POPREBEL project, Western criticism of attacks on LGBT rights in the post-communist region is often critiqued as being homonationalist – both by East European governments and activists across Europe (Ammaturo, 2015).

At the level of the state, homonationalism constitutes 'a critique of how lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to cultural and legal forms of citizenship at the expense of the partial and full expulsion from those rights of other populations' (Puar, 2013, p. 25). For example, queer critics of marriage equality have argued that same-sex marriage privileges a particular type of same-sex relationship, one that most closely resembles the heteronormative ideal of a monogamous couple, thereby creating a moral and legal hierarchy between the latter and, for example, polyamorous partnerships. à See also **homonormativity**.

Finally, at the level of the individual or group, it can be understood as the 'embracing of nationalist and often xenophobic and imperialist interests' by LGBT communities (Puar, 2013, p. 24). An increasing number of LGBT individuals

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in Europe are voting for far-right parties on the grounds that the latter are most likely to curb the influence of Islam, which is constructed as the greatest threat to LGBT rights (Mahdawi, 2017).

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Homophobia

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Homophobia can be defined as the 'irrational fear or intolerance of homosexuality or homosexual persons' (Herek, 1986, p. 563). However, this definition is controversial. It is often criticised by same-sex activists in that it psychologises prejudice against homosexual people in the sense that 'an irrational fear' is not the fault of the person exhibiting the phobic reaction. While phobias are individual phenomena, homophobia can be promoted by groups and governments. For this reason, same-sex activists often prefer the terms 'prejudice' or 'intolerance'. Homophobia is frequently justified with reference to religion and nationalism.

Throughout the centuries, the words of St Paul (Romans I: 26–8) have been used to condemn same-sex practices. In general, social science research confirms that strength of religious belief is a strong predictor of negative attitudes to homosexuality, explained with reference to (i) conservatism, i.e. there is a strong correlation between religiosity and conservatism and between conservatism and homophobia, or (ii) irrationality, i.e. homophobia is an irrational thought process and Christians are more likely to believe what others would consider irrational. Even in nations with low levels of religiosity, negative attitudes towards homosexuality can be conditioned by discourses of religion in identity narratives, constructed as a norm to legitimise a particular understanding of national community.

Prejudice towards non-normative sexualities is also frequently justified with reference to nationalism. Outside of academia nations are understood to be natural phenomena, growing out of extended kin groups, united by shared biology, culture, history, norms and values, stretching back centuries if not millennia. To ensure the nation maintains its internal homogeneity and clear demarcation from the Other, nationalists put considerable effort into promoting its biological and cultural reproduction, a process that can be ensured only by naturalising the patriarchal family and associated public and private roles of men and women. Individuals performing non-normative sexualities 'are thought to threaten this national narrative by undermining the patriarchal family, failing to adhere to national stereotypes of masculinity and femininity, confusing the public/private roles of men and women, undermining the nation's internal homogeneity and deviating from its shared norms, especially those derived from religious teaching' (Mole, 2016, p. 109-110).

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Mental maps

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Mental maps are representations or models of factual geographical reality in the mind. They represent a way of combining factual knowledge of particular places with our subjective perceptions or opinions of (factual or fictional) locations worldwide. In psychology[3], they are understood as cognitive models that represent a type of mental process (or cognition), made from a series of psychological transformations by which a person (or a community) can collect, storage and recall information about relative locations or the characteristics of certain events within everyday environments.

Through the process of socialisation we internalise representations of the world around us in our minds. These representations are organised around certain mental map(s). In that sense, a mental map is a tool that helps us to organise knowledge about the world and allows us to easily interpret it as well as to orient ourselves within a particular environment. The research of these imagined mental maps offers us an insight into affective nebulas (Maffessoli, 1996) within which people live and which impact the way people feel about all matters. A deeper look into particular aspects and structures of mental maps can help us track fear, stress and/or excitement related to different phenomena and/or processes in everyday reality (the factual or the fictional ones). Geographical coordinates of Western Balkans, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, South-East Europe, Mediterranean, Western World etc. are examples of imagined geopolitical constructs that exist only in the meta-realities shaped by particular ideologies.

The mental topography of what we construe as reality can be transformed not only under the impact of changing geographical spaces. According to the Serbian historian Dubravka Stojanović the historical memory is even more important in this respect. In her essay 'Balkanization of Historical Memory' she claims that the process of balkanisation[4]

[3] The concept of cognitive maps was introduced by Edward Tolman, psychologist, in 1948. The concept was used to explain the behavior of rats that appeared to learn the spatial layout of a maze (Tolman, 1948). Subsequently, the concept was applied to other animals, including humans and accepted from the researchers from other disciplines, for example in urban planning (Lynch, 1960).

[4] Balkanisation: the division of a multinational state into smaller ethnically homogeneous entities. The term also is used to refer to ethnic conflict within multiethnic states. It was coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans. The term *Balkanisation* is today invoked to explain the disintegration of some multiethnic states and their devolution into dictatorship, ethnic cleansing, and civil war (Pringle, 2019).

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always implies the constitution of new states and consequently the production of new and transformation of old borders. The process creates not only problems with customs, traffic, passports, currencies, but also with the issues of historical memory. The splitting of states necessarily means the splitting of a constructed shared historical memory. It could be said - the 'balkanisation of memory' (Stojanovic, 2019). This process of re-organisation of the historical memory landscapes and creation of new mental and emotional geography of collective identities is based both on a rhetorical strategy and a political method that aim to create powerful society/identity/region-changing fictions that eventually can lead to changes in existing factual and fictional borders and maps. The mental maps are just the reflection of that struggle between fiction and factuality and thus they are factions (a genre that mixes accounts or real events or personae with fictional narrativisation or dramatisation), which are always just optical illusions, because they are both equally alive in the the way we structure the world around us. Their compelling power results from their being imposed in our cognition of the world around us via socialisation.

Mental maps are factions which map our social and political reality and as an imaginary resource suggest future directions of our political and societal imagination and action. This is the reason why mental maps will be a topic of interest within the framework of the POPREBEL project.

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Mental (ontological) security

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This concept is based on the assumption that it is essential for all people to live in the world which they understand, which makes sense to them. Their culture provides them with instruments to describe, classify, systematise their world (natural, supernatural, social, cultural), so that they may live in a meaningful environment. This gives people a sense of security – mental security, the comfort of living in a world that is understood and makes sense. As Anthony Giddens (1991) points out, the alternative to everyday normality of our experience and existence is chaos, which causes a deep sense of insecurity. Ontological security is 'security of being', a sense of order and continuity, a biographical continuity and wholeness that is supported and recognised in and through their relations with others (Kinnvall, Mitzen, 2016). Such a sense of security is thus a key component of a person's identity, feeling that the world is meaningful and coherent, and 'I' have a secure place in it. I feel secure because the world produces narratives that I understand. It may be worth mentioning that ontological security is also discussed in reference not only to individuals but also to communities, including the EU (Della Salla, 2018; Steele, 2008). Steele also suggests that one of the results of ontological insecurity is shame. This is important, as shame may be experienced by individuals but also by communities which would take various measures to reduce it.

Rapid and radical change, such as migration, political transformation, change of the economic environment disturbs stability of the (natural, social and cultural) environment and deprives people of the sense of being part of a stable, meaningful world – this causes frustration, fear, and anxiety, and may lead to violence. To reduce these negative

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experiences, people tend to search for a chance to re-create the sense of security and stability (Bauman, 2006). They may do it individually or collectively, through their own autonomy and independence, forward-looking activity, entrepreneurial actions, but they may also escape behind secure boundaries of tradition, which gives them simple and definite answers to all questions. The experience of social, cultural, political and economic transformation in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe provides us with a lot of empirical cases to study reactions to the loss of ontological security, and to the burden of choice, which is inseparably linked to responsibility. There may be many reasons why some people find it difficult to restore the sense of ontological, mental security through their own actions or in partnership with others. Much seems to depend here on subjective self-perception as well as 'objective' external conditions. Old age, unemployment, low education inadequate to the changed requirements of the labour market, a dogmatic approach to the world which may be linked to traditional religiosity – these and other factors seem likely to produce a passive reaction to the loss of security, an inability to cope with it individually and constructively, to take the future in one's own hands and to assume responsibility. Escape to tradition may be a solution. In such a situation, people may also choose to follow a strong leader, who guarantees security and who releases them from the need to make difficult decisions. Authoritarian and populist political parties take advantage of it and supply a political offer to such a demand.

In the POPREBEL project the link between ontological security and populism will be explored. The hypothesis here is that significant segments of Central and Eastern European societies, people who are, or consider themselves to be, losers of the post-1989 transformations, and who therefore suffer from the loss of ontological security are searching for ways in which security would be restored. Some of them opt for authoritarian, strong political leadership, as well as hide from the changing world and the need to make difficult choices and bear responsibility behind secure borders of tradition, including religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism.

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Mythologisation

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Mythologisation is a process of creating stories (myths) around selected elements from our past or present, through which those elements (people, events) gain new attributes, are portrayed and interpreted as magical, supernatural, legendary or extraordinary.

Mythologisation is a process that bears a number of important characteristics.

1. **It is selective**. 'Mythologisation' is about choosing from either past or present, from a variety of facts, events, people or places, only a few elements, which become narrated in a special way acquiring new meaning.
2. **It combines elements of truth and fiction**. It is about creation, about building on actual facts and adding new stories to them, which may or may not have factual justification.
3. Through those stories those elements attain new characteristics and **gain new meaning**.

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4. Those new meanings suggest **sacred or semi-sacred interpretations** in which those elements acquire superhuman, extraordinary and exceptional traits, frequently associated with magical efficacy. These new conglomerates of meaning also speak powerfully to our beliefs and the system of identification.
5. As such they are very **difficult to break** and cannot be easily changed by reasoning and appealing to other forms of knowledge, particularly the scientific one. In a sense, the history involved in the creation of those stories becomes a guarantor of their reliability.
6. *Mythologisation* is not just one single act of creation, but rather a whole **process of telling and retelling** of those stories (myths); it involves thus the creation and distribution of meaning.
7. *Mythologisation* is a **contextual process,** as it always serves a purpose and is always located in a particular socio-ocultural setting. The choice of elements upon which the stories (myths) arise depends on the needs of the present.
8. Finally, by providing self-justified explanations that speak to feelings rather than reason, *mythologisation* may become aligned with political strategy; it may be used to strengthen certain narratives or ideologies, as the arguments given (stories/myths) do not require any further translation and explanation.

'Mythologisation' produces all sorts of stories/myths, of which of particular importance for socio-political mobilisation is the so-called **political myth**. A political myth, similar to other types of myth, is a form of ideological narrative or a story that gives the past or some elements from the past important symbolic, almost sacred, meaning in the present. What distinguishes political myth is, first and foremost, the sphere of its applicability in that it is based on elements from the past (distant or recent) that are made operational in the *political* present; and secondly its particular *purpose* – a political myth provides the community with a *sense of common meaning*, equipping it with stories that invent otr reinforce their beliefs and assert their uniqueness.

In the POPREBEL project the concept of political myths will be understood in relation to all sorts of practices in which populist leaders formulate stories surrounding people, events or dates that are functional for their political message. Of importance may be the stories relating to national heroes and national foes (who do they choose and why), national celebrations (what date, what event and why) and myths of origin (where do they place the beginnings or important milestones in the development of the nation).

What is crucial for the deconstruction of such myths are the following elements:

(1) **Explanatory character.** Political myths, due to their selective and simplifying character, make the world more understandable. They flatten the complexity of reality, they tell simple stories about events, people, dates. By doing so, they become powerful cornerstones of collective identity; since they are based in the past, they give coherence to collective memories, even though they themselves do not need to be logical or coherent.

(2) **Truth and fiction.** As selective 'flattening' tales, they are not overly concerned with the factual representation of the reality. This does not mean, however, that they totally disregard facts. As with all myths, they contain a grain of truth but in this particular case it becomes a matter of credibility and survival: for the political myth to be believable, it must be rooted in some past events or at least have some sort of connection with generally known phenomena.

(3) **Legitimacy.** Although it is important what political myths say, it is even more significant what they do, and it is the creation of the connection between the ruling and the ruled. Political myths create a narrative that explains the position of the rulers and turn their power into justified authority. Being grounded in the past, these myths expound the roots of the authority, explaining why those who are in power have in fact the right to do so. To put it simply, political myths create the legitimacy for political rule.

(4) **Feelings and reason.** Since the representation of reality that political myths offer is at best simplistic, the power of these myths does not lie in their factual correctness, but in their strength to appeal to feelings. Political myths are sets of beliefs, not systems of thought. As such they are immune to reason - they cannot be changed by resorting to reason; factual explanation cannot shake them.

(5) **Mobilisation.** Most importantly, political myths have powerful mobilising ability - they can efficiently mobilise the population around certain people, events or ideas. This is possible because political claims that are made on the basis

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of political myths are perceived as valid and justified not because they are logical, factual and coherent, but despite of this. It is actually the lack of conceptual rigidness that fuels the myths.

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Nativism

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Nativism holds that primacy must be granted to the political rights, the economic needs and the cultural identity of the ethnic/native members of titular nations (Pappas, 2018). Schematically, nativism can be conceptualised as a sub-branch of ethno-nationalism with a more powerful stress on anti-immigration. Rhetorically, nativism manifests in an opposition to anything that is interpreted as an 'external threat' to the titular nation, whether it be people (on bio-political grounds), political groups or ideological currents (Mudde, 2007; Minkenberg, 2017). Pappas provides a qualitative and elaborate overview of nativism, as employed in the agendas of political parties, and its distinct features. The most topical ones for the purposes of this project and study can be categorised as follows: (a) the predominantly (conservative) right-wing ideological orientation of these parties; (b) their programmatic insistence on concrete 'right-wing packages' with an emphasis on anti-immigration; (c) varying shades of Euroscepticism, especially as far as opposition to free movement of people within the EU space is concerned (Pappas, 2018).

Providing separate definitions of nativism and xenophobia, Minkenberg (2017) clarifies that whereas xenophobia is a defensive reaction against specific ethno-cultural 'others', nativism is a more distinct and concrete trend that tends to oppose influences perceived as 'alien' altogether. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) outline the conceptualisation of the nation in PRR (populist and radical right-wing) discourses. According to the authors, these discourses comprehend the concept of 'the people' in essentialist, ethno-cultural terms. Thereby, it is the ethnic/native members of the titular nations that constitute 'the people' as the ultimate repository of political sovereignty. This means that in Western Europe, immigrants and their descendants, as well as refugees, may not be regarded as constituents of 'the people'; in Central and Eastern Europe this may also apply to national minorities with a longstanding presence in the region. One noteworthy ambiguity of the situationally adaptive PRR party-family revolves around the binary of 'integration vs repatriation'. More recently, this translates into the programmatic preference of certain cohorts within the West European PRR to integration or, on certain occasions, cultural assimilation disguised as integration.

Currently, the anti-immigration rhetoric of the PRR across Central and Eastern Europe often seems to sideline more 'traditional' areas of discord in domestic ethnopolitics (e.g. minority issues) (Kluknavská and Smolik, 2016; Kovarek, Rona, Hunyadi and Kreko, 2017). Wierenga (2017) and Petsinis (2019) depict radical right-wing nativism in Estonia and Latvia as being opposed to both immigration and 'Western-imposed' multiculturalism. Auers and Kasekamp (2013) note that the nativism of the domestic PRR has been primarily directed toward the Russophone populations in Estonia and Latvia. However, there has also been observed a relative shift in discourse in the past few years because narratives of 'endangered whiteness' have been incorporated into the PRR agendas in these two countries - following the 2015 migration crisis (Kott, 2017). In the case of the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE), there has been some

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acceptance of Russophones inside the frame of the 'endangered whiteness' discourse and in light of a new 'other' in the form of refugees and other migrants.

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Neo-populism from above (from below)

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'Neo-populism from above (from below)' refers to populist policies and initiatives employed by political and cultural actors with the purpose of increasing support for the preservation of their power (Shafir, 2008). Correspondingly, neo-populism from above uses different strategies and techniques than neo-populism from below. Because the POPREBEL project investigates populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe, the concept of neo-populism (both from above and from below) will be employed to illuminate the systemic nature of populisms in post-communist Eastern Europe as well as the ways it is disseminated via popular culture and arts. In this perspective, post-communist neo-populism differs from historical populism in the anti-systemic nature of the later (Shafir 2012, p. 537).

Neo-populism (from above/from below) is a cultural and political movement of the early 21st century, originating mostly in Latin America (Knight 1998). Neo-populism is also understood as media populism and it is distinct from 20th century populisms. Kurt Weyland advances the argument according to which there are compatibilities and synergies between neo-populism and neoliberalism. Grounded in empirical observation of Latin America he claims, 'There are some underlying affinities that make neoliberalism and contemporary populism coincide in important, inherent ways.' (Weyland 2003, p. 2) Consistently, he puts forth the example of Latin America to demonstrate that neoliberalism and neo-populism are inherently compatible in what regards: the 'anti-organizational bent' (materialised in insignificant

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levels of institutionalisation), as well as the prioritisation of numbers over the weight of political resources, 'anti-status-quo orientation, an anti-elite discourse, and a transformatory stance' (Weyland 2003, p. 3). Michael Shafir also elaborates on what 'neo' might connote in post-communist/socialist Central and Eastern Europe and points out that neo-populism in this region does not reject market economy. Actually, in Central and Eastern Europe proponents of neo-populism are both corrupt and virtuous capitalists who '[U]nlike their predecessors, no longer denounce the 'evils' of capitalism [but] only the 'rapaciousness' of capitalists who allegedly forgot where they came from.' (Shafir 2008, p. 431)

It is crucial to mention that the label 'neo-populism' (from above/from below) refers to the use of the media as one of the primary tools of populism (Mazzoleni et al., 2003). Populist entrepreneurs speak to 'the people' directly via the media. Umberto Eco (2007) also elaborated on how media is a mouthpiece for both neo-populists from above and below. Specifically, for some tasks within the POPREBEL project, the focus will be on popular culture and art's ambivalence in both disseminating and resisting the neo-populist's kit of visual rhetoric displayed and disseminated through various media channels. The fact that some initiatives are not originating in the political programmes of Radical Right parties does not make them less populist. The dividing line between populism from above and populism from below is still fluid and might occasion a dialectical exchange. Neo-populism 'is not an 'in-power' or 'out-power' function. It may be found in both government and in opposition' (Shafir 2008, p. 84). Moreover, post-communist neo-populists are at least superficially 'systemic' in the sense that their main claim is not that they want to dismantle the 'system' (as their predecessors claimed) but rather that 'they do so in order to safeguard democracy' (Shafir, 2012, p. 538).

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Othering

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Othering is a term denoting various processes of constructing difference between the Other and the defining subject. One of the key functions of this term is to provide a way of structuring difference by categorising it using the dichotomy of 'self' and 'other' or 'us' and 'them'. It is also understood here as a way of narrating social phenomena in exclusivist categories based on difference.

The concept of Othering is used in a variety of disciplines: philosophy, psychoanalysis, post-colonial studies, gender studies and, more recently, in studies of the far-right and populist discourses. The term 'other' (written either with small 'o' or capital 'O') is derived from Jacques Lacan's writings, in which he emphasised the way in which the notion of the other is crucial in the construction of the self. Lacan likens the 'other' to the mirror reflection of the self, and

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the 'Other' – with a capital 'O' – to the symbolic, meaningful construct that provides the subject with identity (1966). Going beyond the individual level, on a cultural level, the encounter between the Self and the Other is a key challenge to Western philosophy and a question of ethics, according to Emmanuel Levinas (1961), and a defining process of creating meaning in the process of social interaction (as in George Herbert Mead's concept of symbolic interactionism, 1934). Zygmunt Bauman, in his analysis of the contemporary modern or postmodern condition, also defined this dichotomy as central to the contemporary processes of identity construction (1993).

Nevertheless, the relationship between Self and Other is often uneven, marked by tensions which became the focus of academic interest, whether in the context of hegemonies, hierarchies and power/knowledge structures (Foucault, 1965), gender (Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 1990), race (bell hooks, 1992), or in the context of colonial and postcolonial relations. Postcolonial studies, in particular, critically investigate the binary divisions between the 'known' and the 'foreign', the 'coloniser' and 'the colonised' and the 'Self' and the 'Other' (Fabian, 2002; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1987; Ashcroft et al., 2000). In such dualistic constructions, it is the dominant discourse that defines who and what can be considered as Other and what are the Other's characteristics. Difference in such a relationship of power acquires a negative connotation. The Other becomes a passive subject that can only be defined and described, represented (or rather misrepresented) in a simplified and homogenised manner. Othering may thus be understood not only as a necessary element of identity construction, setting borders between 'us' and 'them', but also as a tool of discourse of domination, subordination, estrangement, stereotyping or fetishisation. Furthermore, the function of the process of Othering is the confirmation and delineation of the Self.

The concept of Othering is applied in the study of populist narratives (and, in particular, right-wing populist discourses), due to the fact that use of Othering is a useful tool to evoke fear, polarise, scapegoat or divert attention. Populist Othering can be linked with xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-migrant discourses, ethnic, religious and cultural prejudices, but also homophobia and anti-feminism. Various studies describe the different facets of how the image of a threatening Other is used in political and social discourses (Bunzl, 2007; Betz 2003, 2007, 2013; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2015; Lazaridis & Campani, eds. 2016, 2017; Kajta 2017; Krzyżanowski 2018; Kallis 2008; Taras 2009).

In the POPREBEL project, the notion of Othering will be used in two main ways. Firstly, as in existing literature linking Othering and populism, to denote a plethora of representations of the ideological 'enemy', constructed on the basis of various forms of cultural Otherness. However, these representations of Others may not always be constructed on the stereotypical categories of ethnic, religious or sexual difference but may also have their source in political or ideological differences (e.g. in Polish right-wing discourses, vegetarians or environmentalists could be considered as ideological 'enemies'). Secondly, the concept of Othering will be used to describe the way in which Europe – and the European Union – is presented in populist discourses of the CEE region. The strategies of distancing, delegitimisation, estrangement as well as denying rationality are part of a gradual shift in a distorted relation between Self-Other, as a result of which Europe starts to be positioned as the external, culturally foreign Other.

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(The) people

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'The people' is a broad societal category that typically refers to a group of average, ordinary people who do not possess any special privileges or power. It is a relatively plastic and capacious concept of high social and political relevance.

There are four crucial characteristics that define this notion socially. Firstly, 'the people' is by definition a collective category. Although composed of the multitude of individual persons, 'the people' is not a *collection of individuals* (there is no individuality involved) but a *collective unit.* The concept unites the plurality of its members, with a **notion of unity**, thus 'the people' typically appear as one. Secondly, 'the people' is a quite flexible and to a certain extent vague category. There is no one clear-cut criterion of inclusion, and in fact, 'the people' may include quite diverse sectors of the population. What defines 'the people' is not what they have or who they are, but what they are not, what they do not possess, and it is a rank or a special position within the society. To put it differently, the category of 'the people' is only definable **within the relations of power**: 'the people' are those members of the society, those citizens, who do not have special power, who are being governed; in other words all the ordinary people, not the government or the ruling classes/elites. Thirdly and seemingly paradoxically, 'the people' appear to be a relatively **homogenous group**. Although often quite diverse, they are typically portrayed as a community of those who share original values, culture and traditions. 'The people' are discursively located in the centre of the society, they include

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only its true members, who constitute the community and who uphold its values. Fourthly and finally, 'the people' is in fact the most spacious and thus the widest social group within a state. 'The people' are imagined as the majority; they are numerous, they are subordinate, they lead the normal life, they work, they preserve the communitarian values. In a sense, 'the people' is the contemporary version of what in feudal society was defined as **the masses**.

The political usefulness of this category derives from its interconnectedness with the concept of 'the nation' and 'the sovereign'. The association between 'the people' and 'the nation', stems from the centrality and supposed homogeneity of 'the people' (point 3 above) and its majoritarian character (point 4). Since 'the people' are imagined as a homogenous, original, value-preserving majority, they are indeed often seen as the epitome of 'the nation'. In political narratives, especially in populist discourse, 'the people' is simply equated with 'the nation'. The relationship between 'the people' and 'the sovereign', on the other hand, derives from power relations (point 2) and the majoritarian character of 'the people' (point 4). 'The people' are not only the ones who are being governed, but they are - at the same time - the ones who have the power to vote. In contemporary democracies, this very fact transforms them into a valuable resource; they become the key target of political appeal, and the source - once convinced to cast the vote - of political legitimisation. This is within 'the people' where the constituent power resides. This double political standing of 'the people', the interplay between subordination and legitimisation is what gives 'the people' the attributes of 'the sovereign'.

The most visible way in which the notion of 'the people' has been utilised for political gains is the populist narrative. For the populists 'the people' lay at the very centre of their rhetoric. It is the most fundamental concept in their discourse in terms of both content and narrative.

In POPREBEL project – following the populist discourse – the category of 'the people' will appear in the context of:

1. **The nation**. 'The people' are imagined as living in the heartland of the country and upholding the true original communitarian values. Thus, very strong connection between 'the people' and traditions and traditionalism, folk culture and popular values. Not uncommonly, would 'the people' appear in the discourse with the adjective 'true' [e.g. true Poles, true Hungarians]
2. **The historical underdog**. 'The people' possess certain socioeconomic qualities (usually representing lower and middle strata, people without proper representation or voice, the oppressed). In the case of the CEE countries 'the people' are seen as those who were oppressed by the communist regime, and later marginalised by economic and political transformation, privatisation and democratisation, and further alienated by the forces of globalisation. 'The people' are portrayed as those who lost or – at best – did not win as much as they ought to have won.
3. **The sovereign.** 'The people' are imagined as marginalised and at the same time as those who need to get their power back. Their interests are to be represented by populist leaders, who present themselves as the spokespersons of 'the people'.
4. **The opposition to 'the elites'.** The adversarial relationship between both categories does not only refer to their social, cultural or economic qualities, but more importantly – it is a binary moral opposition between good and evil. While 'the people' are imagined as epitomising true values and virtuousness, 'the elites' are associated with corruption, dishonesty and fraudulence. This opposition between 'the people' and 'the elites' operates both on national as well as international level. Thus – as is the case in CEE populist narratives – 'the people' are often portrayed as true nationals, marginalised in the past, but generality good and value preserving majority, while 'the elites' are foreign, post-communist, liberal, pro-western, corrupt and spoiled.

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Politics of memory

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The politics of memory (PoM) means 'a set of cultural and institutional practices [which] are designed to publicly commemorate and/or remember a single event, a relatively clearly delineated and interrelated set of events, or a distinguishable past process' (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014, p. 14). Their 'formulation and propagation involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society' (Ibid, 16). And, as such, the objective of the PoM is the creation of a certain vision of the past which is wanted, expected and reached by social actors who usually have access to financial, organisational, administrative and/or bureaucratic means (Kowalski, Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, p. 17; see also Leggewie, Meyer, 2005, p. 5). In more general terms the PoM engages regulations of collective memory through public practices and norms and in consequence can also be defined as 'strategies the political actors employ to make others remember in certain specific ways and the effects of such mnemonic manipulations' (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014, p. 7, see as well Miller, 2010, p. 10; Sierp, 2014, pp. 18−19; Nijakowski, 2008, pp. 41–47).

The objective of varied forms of the PoM is to establish a socially shared representation of the past which stays in relation to collective identity/s. In concrete memorial practices social actors attempt to shape the collective memory as it has 'the capacity to unite a social group and become an effective marker of social differentiation' (Kowalski, Törnquist-Plewa, 2016, p. 17; see also: Olick, 2008, p. 159). The importance of collective memory also comes from the fact that it can contribute to the cohesiveness of a group. In other words, the PoM plays a role in the process of identity formation and anchors groups in a clearly demarcated past to which these groups feel the righteous and unique heirs. As a consequence of these actions, the past is comprehensible and socially shared, linked to the present, value laden and inscribed into the public space (Dicks, 2003).

Although the PoM expresses a will to invent and finally control a socially shared representation of the past, its final product is never equally shared by all the members of a group (Olick, 2008, p. 159). In consequence, the constructed image of the past does not only unite groups but can lead as well to the fight for recognition of their own interpretations of the past. It happens as the PoM constantly balances between the remembrance and oblivion of the past (see: Ricoeur, 2004) and raises questions upon what, why, where and by whom it should be remembered.

It is important to separate the state politics of memory from its other types. In this respect, the state politics of memory takes the form of dominant practices dealing with the past, i.e. 'public commemoration rituals, constitution of museums, memorials and spaces for remembrance' (Rufer, 2012). On the other side, there exists a plethora of social actors who 'strive for the recognition and visibility of collective processes of underground remembrance, rarely perceived in the organic agenda of the state or the academy' (Rufer, 2012). This is how 'the political in memory' destabilises the state politics of memory by being 'a resistive force up against the stabilizing impulse of politics' (Rufer, 2012; for the distinction between 'the politics of memory' and 'the political in memory' see as De la Peza and Rufer, 2009). In other words, the multifaceted character of the PoM gives rise to the tension between the state/official/majority PoM (top-down processes), and its civic/unofficial/minority equivalent (bottom-up processes).

As a social practice the politics of memory has a discursive character and embraces the ways in which mnemonic actors invent/shape 'our' representation of the past. It is a process which identifies, classifies, legitimises and manages the past considered as 'ours'. By its nature this process is political (since it is connected with power and control over the past), selective and partial (as based on choice) and contested (as raising protests and controversies) (Smith 2006, p. 11). In general terms, one might say that although the PoM concerns the past, its aim is not only to define who 'we' are in the present, but rather to articulate who 'we' ought to be now and in the future.

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Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe

For the needs of the POPREBEL project the concept of politics of memory has a crucial role as it enables to grasp, comprehend and describe memorial practices (and their discursive character) of different social actors operating in post-communist countries which have seen the rise of populism during the second decade of the 21st century. In other words, the POPREBEL project investigates how concrete memorial practices undertaken by state and civic actors (representing for instance NGOs and ethnic/sexual minorities etc.) legitimise constantly mutable political, social, cultural goals, and – finally – how they operate between (or lead to) social inclusion and exclusion.

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Populist art

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Populist art is a concept introduced by Alberto Asor Rosa in 1965 - in his seminal book *Writers and the People* - which refers to the auspices under which a work of art can be called 'populist.' Since then, many understandings of 'populist art' have emerged in various cultural-political circles. Populist art is that type of cultural production (literary, visual, musical and so on) that comprises an affirmative evaluation of 'the people' in ideological, ethical, historical or social terms. There are various meanings of 'populism' that can be carried by an artwork. Not only are the artworks that depict positive evaluations of the people instances of populist art but also those art pieces that render 'the people' as a defective model, as brutalised victims of power and capital or as 'bare life' entities (Agamben).

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Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe

Recently, Marco Baravalle has argued that Alberto Asor Rosa's book targeted cultural producers and literary critics whose creations embodied 'the Communist Party's hegemony over literary production—a hegemony based on the legacy of the Resistance on one hand, and on a populist political and cultural vision on the other' (Baravalle, 2018). Similarly, according to Alberto Asor Rosa, a work of art is populist whenever it displays 'the people' as the main topic and as a model to be followed. 'The people' category is expected to act as a mobilising force that galvanises spectators (readers) to various political ends. Still, populist art does not depend on the political stance of the artist. However, Alberto Asor Rosa's theory of populist art is context dependent (i.e. Italy of the 1960s) and cannot account for certain instances of contemporary populist art.

In order to understand what 'populist art' is, one must explore first the relationship between 'the artistic' and 'popular.' Artistic production that is acknowledged as 'popular' is usually entertaining, or as Clement Greenberg put it, kitsch (Greenberg in *Avant-Garde and Kitsch*, 1939). Kitsch (popular culture) is easily expressible, easy understandable and triggers in audiences 'sensationalist effects,' whereas avant-garde art occasions aesthetic judgements of a superior nature. Populist art affects everyone, especially 'all those people whom contemporary art has failed to reach or move' (Lippard, 1976, p. 8). Since in the last decade, populism - and especially right-wing populism - has gained momentum in Eastern Europe to a disquieting extent, the 'emotional backlash' (Galston 2018, p. 5) against the elites, immigrants, refugees, sexual and ethnic minorities, and everyone else who is not 'ours,' is also materialised in the culture wars directed against those artistic productions that undermine and challenge national pride. The most devoted allies of populist art are the escapist fantasies of those dissatisfied with the present. Yet, between art's ability to reveal the complexities of existence in unique and exquisite formats and populism's models of 'popular' appeal to the 'people,' there will always be a tension that we aim to illuminate as part of the POPREBEL's task to disentangle the realm of popular culture and art's relation to populism.

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Populist and radical right (PRR)

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We rely upon the work of Cas Mudde (2007) when categorising this party family. A populist radical right (PRR) party is any party which combines populism, nativism and authoritarianism (i.e. a strict law and order approach). While populism is a broadly defined concept, we approach this as a thin-centred ideology which divides society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the people and the elite (Mudde, 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Although one of the core components of the PRR party family, populism is not limited to the far right. While this party-family can be classified by the aforementioned three components, it should be firmly noted that the PRR is heterogenous. Mudde (2019) contends that diversity has increased even further in the fourth wave of the radical right, which began at roughly the turn of the century. Indeed, the populist radical right party family includes such diverse parties as the National Rally (formerly the National Front) in France, The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands as well as parties such

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as the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Alternative for Germany, the Latvian National Alliance (the NA) and the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE).

Our approach to this party family vis-à-vis Mudde's three components is that nativism (together with ethno-nationalism) is the host ideology, meaning that this plays a larger role in both party ideology and the demand side for voters. Nativism manifests in an opposition to anything that is perceived as an 'external threat' to the titular nation, whether it be people (on bio-political grounds), political groups, or ideological currents (Mudde, 2007; Minkenberg, 2017). We differentiate here between xenophobia and nativism in two distinct ways. First, that nativism relies upon concrete ideas and concepts, whereas xenophobia centres on ethno-cultural or religious 'others' in a more 'loose' and less coherent fashion (Minkenberg 2017). Secondly, and of crucial importance to our cases and argument, is that nativism is distinct to each specific nation, evident in the context of specific titular nations, although as the transnationalism of the PRR party family accelerates, the shared commonalities are becoming more enhanced - especially the notion of a Europe or European peoples under threat (Wierenga, 2017).

While extensive research has been conducted on this party-family, the lion's share in the literature has been devoted to Western Europe. However, there is a growing literature on the PRR in Central and Eastern Europe which notes the primary difference between the traditional targets and the difference in ideological extremes. Minkenberg (2017a & 2017b) outlines the primary distinctions between PRR political parties and other organisations in the West and the East: notably, that the PRR in Central and Eastern Europe is ideologically more extreme (as well as organisationally fluid) due to the nature of the transition processes, traditions of nationalism, political culture and new cleavages and party systems (ibid).

Both Latvia's National Alliance and the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) have been identified in the existing academic literature as belonging to this party-family. We also consider, in line-with Mudde (2019), that populism is a part of the political make-up of these two parties, but that the host ideology is nativism in addition to ethno-nationalism (Rydgren, 2017). We situate the PRR in Latvia and Estonia inside the broader context of Central and Eastern Europe but underline some significant differences. For instance, while grass-roots organisations are of pivotal importance for the political engagement of the far right, as broadly defined, both organisations under study are by now solidly structured and operate as full-fledged parties, not movements. This differentiates EKRE and National Alliance from radical right-wing parties in, say, the Visegrad Four group of states that have evolved out of 'bottom-up' formation processes and considerably rely on mass mobilisation coordinated by grass-roots groupings (e.g. Jobbik in Hungary and Naše Slovensko/'Our Slovakia').

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Sexuality

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The term 'sexuality' is used to mean a number of things. In its broadest sense, it can be understood as 'referring to all erotically significant aspects of social life and social being, such as desires, practices, relationships and identities' (Jackson, 2006, p.106). In POPREBEL, however, sexuality will be used specifically to refer to 'sexual orientation', i.e. attraction to people of the opposite sex (heterosexuality), the same sex (homosexuality), both sexes (bisexuality) or neither sex (asexuality). While homosexual is used to refer to both men and women, different terms are often used for homosexual men (gay) and homosexual women (lesbian). The term 'queer' emerged as an alternative to gay, lesbian and bisexual in response to critiques that the latter were specifically Western conceptions of selfhood, which did not map on to the range of identities and subjectivities in non-Western cultures. (Queer can also be used to refer to transgender but this is a gender rather than a sexual identity.)

As with all aspects of social life, we must differentiate between sexuality as a category of analysis, i.e. how it is understood by academics, and as a category of practice, i.e. how it is used in everyday discourse. Outside of academia, sexual orientation is generally understood to be an innate and fixed characteristic. Heteronormative understandings of the sex-gender-sexuality nexus posit a close and linear relationship between sex (understood in binary terms as the biological categorisation of individuals into men and women on the basis of reproductive organs), gender (understood in binary terms as the human traits and social roles of men and women emerging out of binary sex) and sexual orientation (attraction to the opposite sex only). As a category of analysis, by contrast, sexuality is understood within academia – and particularly the social sciences – to be fluid, socially constructed and historically and culturally contingent. Sexuality is fluid in the sense that sexual orientation can change over the course of one's life. Sexuality is socially constructed in the sense that sexual categories and the meanings attached to them are constructed by institutions such as the Church, the family and secular institutions, including parliaments but also the law and especially medicine. Institutions such as these 'produce and/or reproduce ideologies and norms, which define social expectations' with regard to acceptable sexual mores and behaviours (Štuhlhofer and Sandfort 2005, p. 5). And sexuality is historically and culturally contingent in the sense that the meanings attached to its various forms differ across time and space. As Jeffrey Weeks explains, 'homosexuality, like all forms of sexuality, has different meanings in different cultures – so much so that it becomes difficult to find any common essence which links the different ways it is lived' (1992: xi).

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Sovereignty

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The concept of sovereignty in the modern sense finds its first elaboration in the theory of Jean Bodin, who defined national sovereignty as supreme power in the state (Bodin, 2014). Throughout the history of political philosophy, the concept of sovereignty has been changing and one of the major turning points has been Kant's idea of perpetual peace,

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which gave rise to the idea that republics will not go into the war with each other. Under Kant's influence the issue of sovereignty has migrated into the arena of international relations (Kant, 2006). Thanks to his legacy, this issue remains an important part of international law. During World War I, Kant's idea was taken over and implemented by US President Woodrow Wilson (creation of the League of Nations in 1919) and after the Second World War, the United Nations assumed the role of a guarantor of peace in the international arena, but at the cost of challenges to national sovereignties. The process of globalisation poses a further challenge to the question of national sovereignty and it becomes one of the main themes of modern times (Barkin, 2006).

The concept of nation-state sovereignty is based on the exclusive territorial principle and control of state policy and institutions that is devoid of foreign influence. During the last three centuries the dominant elites established more or less centralised rule and monopolised the political decision-making process, taxation and the provision of public goods. The population was mobilised in the general state policy and in the military. Political modernisation changed the nature of ties between members of the population at large and between the general population and political elites. The United Nations Charter, the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States and the charters of regional international organisations claim that all states are equal and enjoy the same rights and duties based upon the mere fact of their existence as entities under international law. Populist movements revived the idea of a sovereign nation state rejecting the concept of a united Europe based on four European freedoms of movement for goods, services, capital and people. European Union has also built the institutions of sovereignty on supra-national level, including common security and foreign policy. After 1989, the national economies of sovereign nation-states were becoming difficult to regulate in the new reality of high capital mobility and the intensification of transnational economic and societal dynamics and exchanges. Western societies were loosening traditional identifications like religion and social class.

Most European populist policies are contesting the sovereignty of joint EU institutions. Political evolution and post-colonial and post-communist economic growth resulted in a growing population of 'losers of globalisation' and the new national state becomes a social and political refuge. Contemporary European populism is a set of responses to the emergence of the internationalised state, as the state elites have opted in favour the transnational policies and supranational institutions. From the nation-state elites emerged new cosmopolitan elites that have eluded the immediate control of their home countries and societies, as the governing has become detached from national representative processes. Referring to the idea of restoring the sovereignty of the nation-state, contemporary European populism is articulating social frustrations as the demands for political recognition and representation on the national level instead on the level of a national sovereignty delegated to common EU institutions. Populism on the extreme political right requires a return to nation-state sovereignty: the renewal of national border controls in order to manage the flow of migrants, financial autonomy, narrowing the domain of human rights, arrangements of sovereign national governments with Russia and China, etc. Populism on the extreme political left requires more economic nationalism, nationalisation, the review of close EU relations with the US, etc. Populist right and left both claim a certain rejection of EU supra-national political bodies.

The visions of a contemporary sovereign state consider a nation constructed as a community mobilised against the internal and external enemies ranked within the modern liberal-democratic order. The sovereign nation-state possesses the exclusive right to decide without outside interference. The state and national sovereignty are established on the shared time, on the common past, present and future, and on the shared space, a territory with borders and certain characteristics as a shared language and laws.

The myths of a classical sovereignty are based on imaginary, fictitious events and symbols from the distant past. On the contrary, the myths of European Union are based on real facts, common decisions and clear institutional processes. The EU already owns national symbols as the flag, anthem, Europe Day (9 May), registration plates, the euro as the official currency of 19 of the 28 member states, common borders, etc. Integration is also being introduced into school systems. (Similar integrative processes were carried out at the national level in the 19th century, while the continental empires disappeared in 1918.)

The weakness of supranational European sovereignty is also seen in the 'symbolic deficit' of the European institutions. The common European national feeling is still weaker than connections with proto-national cores, although the shared, integrated European sovereignty is the fact, and is a reality that Europeans have been living for decades ago.

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Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe

EU residents mostly remember the time spent in peace, the undisturbed continuity of prosperity (until the 2008 financial crisis), and the time spent within the integrated Europe without borders and other barriers.

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Traditionalism

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If mental or 'ontological' security seems to be a desired state of mind and since rapid and radical change disturbs it, then a return to tradition may be a solution. Freedom may be a burden, especially since it is connected to responsibility. People who for various reasons do not feel fit to respond individually to the challenge of change look for a remedy in a form of collective identity based on tradition. Tradition appears in this process of escape from freedom of choice and responsibility as a source of values and norms, often legitimised by religion; it defines 'us' as a community, answers questions regarding our collective identity and provides a sense of belonging to the world where everything and everybody have their place – it may also help to understand 'the others', who represent a dangerous alternative to the traditional system – for example elites, immigrants or liberals.

Tradition has been a popular subject of philosophical and sociological reflection. Already at the beginning of modernity conservative philosophers spoke of tradition, which represented everything which was important and valuable as being threatened by the French Revolution and its negative consequences (Burke, 1790). In contrast to this conservative view, Karl Marx saw tradition as a burden to our minds (Marx, 1852). In general, tradition and modernity were seen as mutually opposite, while the development of modernity was believed to gradually eliminate tradition from social life. This view was challenged when tradition appeared to be an important point of reference in identity construction, including national and ethnic identities, which refer to tradition in search for identity deeply rooted in the past. Two main lines of argument were developed: according to one, tradition was an oppressive burden to society, making it more difficult for people to choose their own way of life independently of the legacy of the past. The second argument, developed mainly in the period of Romanticism, went in the opposite direction: tradition is for us a rich treasury from which we may get useful and valuable inspiration. Gadamer followed this point of view with the argument that we never take tradition for granted; we interpret it and are in a kind of dialogue with it. In this way tradition has influence on us, while we at the same time influence it by re-interpreting its message (Gadamer, 1989).

With the development of empirical sociology, tradition became an important subject of research, not only of premodern societies but also in the context of reflection of the significance of heritage and importance of the past for the present developments. Jerzy Szacki (1971) and Edward Shils (1981) devoted comprehensive studies to the concept of tradition as the presence of the past in the contemporary society. It became clear that tradition is a very useful and powerful instrument, which may be used in attempts to construct political and ideological images and to become an

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essential part of collective identity. The very influential book, *The Invention of Tradition* by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), shows some examples of such manipulation.

Traditionalism is a kind of policy aiming at the return to tradition in order to find the roots of culture, remove unwanted elements of our way of life which were borrowed from or imposed by modern society. This movement is well known in the post-colonial world, where efforts are made to replace the imposed, Western values and ways by the society's own, traditional ones, suppressed and forgotten, but now revived (see for example Braginsky, 2004). In Europe similar processes are taking place, with tradition becoming a point of reference in the search for the authenticity of culture, while the political agenda behind it is to emphasise the contrast between the original, authentic culture of 'the people' and the artificial Westernisation imposed by those who had power to do so.

In this context traditionalism appears in post-communist Europe as a strategy to escape from the unknown, alien and dangerous new values and ways of life which come from the EU to Eastern Europe. To protect themselves from this danger Eastern European societies should recreate their own traditions and with this the people's healthy and moral way of life and ontological security. This return to tradition does not of course mean that people move to a kind of pre-modern agrarian community. Neo-traditionalism is rather a kind of collective identity – an image and meaningful actions, which refer to tradition as a source of stable and legitimate values which explain the world in simple terms, describe problems in simple categories connected with value judgements, and restore the feeling of belonging to a stable and secure community.

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Victimisation

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Victimisation is a term that has been used to describe the processes of discrimination, exclusion and humiliation of certain groups or individuals - in a narrow sense by lawyers and crime-prevention services and in a broader sense by scholars of human rights and social sciences. It is often discussed as being motivated by gender or race and/or directed towards specific ethnic groups or minorities (Elias, 1986, Björgoand Witte, 1993, Winterdyk & Antonopoulos, 2008). Here, the term 'victimisation' is used to a large extent as a metaphor for 'oppression', understood in a larger, social, political and historical sense. As such, the discourse of victimisation may be part of the discursive narratives on national identity (Wodak et al., 2009), which aim at presenting the nation as an innocent victim of foreign powers or internal enemies. In populist discourses, victimisation is used liberally to denote the groups that have been oppressed – the

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people, the nation, the citizens – by either global powers, rival nations, historical enemies but also ideological foes (Lazaridis, 2016). A typical strategy in this process is what Ruth Wodak called 'turning tables' (1991) – those accused of violence or oppression present themselves as innocent victims. Victimisation may be a part of imagining communities (Anderson, 1983), where a solid construct of the nation (or other group) is constituted in order to create relevant frameworks for social cohesion based on shared collective definition.

In discourse of populisms, narrating nations as victims of external powers may be regarded as an exemplification of a strategy used in propaganda (and any political P.R.) where – in the general vision of social world – certain groups are seen as homogenised and not diverse. As a result of such simplification a storytelling about homogenous groups of victims and/or perpetrators (in populist's discourses perpetrators are not always strictly defined as creating the mere image, feeling and sense of being threatened and/or harmed may be more important for populists) becomes a way of political legitimacy, which may be also supported with the elements or fragments of mythological narratives (especially within the processes of national identity building) and imagine threats to whole normative system. Presenting a nation (or other group) as a collective victim supports the notion of homogenised 'people', who are supposed to legitimise power. At the same time victimisation supports strengthening images of heroes and heroism, accurately invented and tailored to fit the needs of current communication processes: mythology provides effective framework for the promotion of values defended and popularised in populist ideologies.

In structural anthropology the figure of victim is associated with the one of sacrifice (Leach, 1972). When monolithic constructs of nations are represented by martyrs, sacrifice may be seen as an added value to the narratives standing behind the nations and justify their collective efforts in completing vital tasks (for instance Poland and constantly saving Europe from evil). A figure of treason often accompanies victimisation emphasising good intentions and the legitimacy of power (for instance, Hungary betrayed in Trianon but allegedly aspiring to rule over Great Hungary).

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3 Conclusions

The glossary provides a common frame of reference and a basis for empirical research for scientists working in Work Package 3. Most concepts are used across research tasks and a common definition and understanding of such concepts is crucial for the coherence of the package. The glossary will thus help researchers to find connections among various case studies explored in WP3 and to formulate conclusions of a more universal nature, transcending country-specific contexts. It is not seen as a final outcome of the project but rather as a work-in-progress, which will be revised and supplemented with new insights following the research performed in the project. The glossary is a deliverable for WP3 but at the end of the project, it may be enlarged to include key concepts used by researchers in other POPREBEL work packages. Finally, the POPREBEL project participants plan to publish the glossary, as it may prove useful to scholars working in similar areas of research and to the wider public.

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