

# Is Chávez Populist?

## Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective

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This article pushes forward our understanding of populism by developing one of the more underappreciated definitions of populism, populism as discourse. It does so by creating a quantitative measure of populist discourse suitable for cross-country and historical analysis. The article starts by laying out the discursive definition of populism in the context of existing definitions. It then operationalizes this definition through a holistic grading of speeches by current chief executives and a few historical figures. The result is a data set of elite-level populist discourse in more than 40 current and past governments from a variety of countries across the world, with special focus on Latin America. This measurement has high reliability comparable to standard human-coded content analysis, compares well to common understandings of actual cases of populism, and is a reasonably efficient technique even in small samples.

**Keywords:** *populism; discourse; textual analysis; holistic grading; measurement*

Let no one forget that we are confronting the Devil himself. Sunday, 3 December at the ballot box we will confront the imperialist government of the United States of North America [sic]—that is our real adversary, not these has-beens here, these lackeys of imperialism. . . .

Long live Christ, the first great revolutionary of our time! Martyr of the peoples, Christ Redeemer, today is his day, the day of Christ the King. . . .

You the people are the giant that awoke, I your humble soldier will only do what you say. I am at your orders to continue clearing the way to the greater Fatherland. . . . Because you are not going to reelect Chávez really,

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you are going to reelect yourselves, the people will reelect the people. Chávez is nothing but an instrument of the people.

Hugo Chávez

When we read the previous quotes from Hugo Chávez's closing campaign speech of December 2006, we may find ourselves agreeing with scholars and journalists who depict him as a populist ("The Americas," 2006; Castañeda, 2006; Roberts, 2006; Weyland, 2003). While no one word really stands out, except perhaps the frequent reference to "the people," these quotes capture a set of ideas that seem vaguely democratic but violently opposed to assumptions of pluralist democracy. What is it about these words that makes them sound populist? Do other politicians that we traditionally regard as populist sound similar?

These questions get at the heart of an ongoing academic debate over the definition and nature of populism. Despite the concept's continuing prevalence, scholars, journalists, and much of the public are still unsure of what the word means. Traditional social science definitions of populism focus on long-term processes of modernization and industrialization or on the macroeconomic policies of particular governments. More recent definitions focus on populism as a "political" concept that refers to strategies and institutions (Roberts, 2006; Weyland, 2001). Still others emphasize discourse and ideas, which are touched on in the aforementioned quotes from Chávez (Canovan, 1999; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004).

This continuing conceptual confusion is paralleled by a lack of empirical rigor. Much as with older accounts of populism, newer ones tend to declare certain leaders populist by fiat rather than through any kind of systematic measurement, and analyses that do offer justifications are usually single-country studies that avoid demonstrating the broad applicability or reliability of their measure. Scholars have recently begun measuring populism using quantitative techniques, especially textual analysis (Armony & Armony, 2005; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). These are exciting advances, but they are the exception, and the scope of their analyses is still limited across time and space. Hence, none of the current conceptualizations of populism have been subjected to any large-scale exercise in quantitative measurement.

This article pushes forward our understanding of populism by developing one of the more underappreciated definitions of populism: populism as discourse. It does so by creating a quantitative measure of discourse that is suitable for cross-country and historical analysis. The article starts by laying out the discursive definition of populism in the context of existing

approaches. It then operationalizes the discursive definition through a novel holistic grading of speeches by current chief executives and a few historical figures. The result is a data set of elite-level populist discourse in more than 40 current and past governments from a variety of countries across the world, with special focus on Latin America. This measurement has high reliability comparable to standard human-coded content analysis, compares well to common understandings of actual cases of populism, and is a reasonably efficient technique even in small samples.

## Defining Populism as Discourse

There are four principal definitions of populism used in the social sciences today: structural, economic, political-institutional, and discursive. The first three of these are common in the study of populism in the developing world, particularly Latin America, and have already been extensively critiqued by other scholars (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 2001). The structuralist approach to populism emphasizes its social origins and associates it with certain stages of development, especially the attempt at industrialization in countries located at the periphery of the world economy. According to this view, populist regimes are those using cross-class coalitions and popular mobilization to support import-substituting industrialization (ISI) (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Di Tella, 1965, 1997; Germani, 1978; Ianni, 1975; Weffort, 1973). The economic approach to populism identifies it with policy outputs—specifically, shortsighted economic policies that appeal to the poor (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991). And the political approach sees populism as a phenomena rooted in the basic struggle over control of government, policy, and core values of the community. This latter approach—which is also the most current (see Roberts, 2003; Weyland, 2001)—focuses on institutional or material aspects of populism such as the degree of institutionalization of the organization embodying the populism, its low esteem for existing institutions of representative democracy, its emphasis on support from large numbers of voters, and the presence of a charismatic leader.

The fourth definition, and the focus of this article, is the discursive one. It sees populism as a Manichaeian discourse that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite. This definition is more common to the study of populism in Western Europe and the United States but is largely unknown to mainstream political science because of its association with antipositivist currents within postmodernism.

The first thing to note about the discursive definition is that it describes something innately cultural. *Culture* is used here in the Geertzian sense, as something rooted in our shared ability to assign meanings to the world around us (Eckstein, 1996). Scholars who define populism discursively use a variety of labels—referring to it as a political “style” (Knight, 1998), a “discourse” (de la Torre, 2000; Laclau, 2005), a “language” (Kazin, 1998), an “appeal” (Canovan, 1999), or a “thin ideology” (Mudde, 2004)—but all of them see it as a set of ideas rather than as a set of actions isolated from their underlying meanings for leaders and participants.

What are these ideas that constitute populist discourse? Scholars who study populism have sometimes disparaged the lack of ideological precision in populist movements, and these concerns are not without grounds. But analyses of populist discourse all highlight a series of common, rough elements of linguistic form and content that distinguish populism from other political discourses. I explain these here by drawing on some of Chávez’s words, although I emphasize that these features are not unique to Chávez’s rhetoric.

First, populism is a Manichaean discourse because it assigns a moral dimension to everything, no matter how technical, and interprets it as part of a cosmic struggle between good and evil (de la Torre, 2000). History is not just proceeding toward some final conflict but has already arrived, and there can be no fence sitters in this struggle. Hence, in the previous quotes we find Chávez referring to the election as a contest between the forces of good and evil. This is no ordinary contest; the opposition represents “the Devil himself” while the forces allied with the Bolivarian cause are identified with Christ. Later in the speech, Chávez frames the election as a stark choice. What is at stake is not simply whether Chávez remains in power during the next presidential term but whether Venezuela becomes “a truly strong and free country, independent and prosperous” or instead “a country reduced once more to slavery and darkness.”

Within this dualistic vision, the good has a particular identity: It is the will of the people. The populist notion of the popular will is essentially a crude version of Rousseau’s General Will. The mass of individual citizens are the rightful sovereign; given enough time for reasoned discourse, they will come to a knowledge of their collective interest, and the government must be constructed in such a way that it can embody their will. Chávez, for example, refers to his listeners as *el pueblo* in the singular and talks about them as “the giant that awoke,” and later in the same speech he proclaims to dedicate “every hour, every day” of his life to the question of “how to give more power to the poor, how to give more power to the people.” The populist notion of the General Will ascribes particular virtue to the views and collective traditions of common, ordinary folk, who are seen as the overwhelming majority (Wiles, 1969). The voice of the people is the voice of God—*Vox populi, vox dei*.

On the other side of this Manichaeian struggle is a conspiring elite that has subverted the will of the people. As Hofstadter (1966) eloquently describes in a classic essay on the “paranoid mentality” in American politics, for populists “this enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving” (pp. 31-32). Populism has a preoccupation with discovering and identifying this enemy, as this process is what helps negatively constitute the people. Thus, Chávez not only demonizes his opposition but associates them with sinister conspiracies by international forces led by the United States. He reminds his listeners of who the “real” opponent is and that the opposition leaders are “lackeys of imperialism.” Only those who reject and fight against this enemy can be part of the people’s crusade.

This set of discursive premises has two important corollaries. First, at least in the early stages of a populist movement, the subversion of the people’s will means that some form of liberation or revolution is required, or what Laclau (2005) terms a “rupture.” The old system has been taken over by the forces of evil and no longer serves the people. This conflict is not over particular policies or issues but institutions and the system. These must be remade or at least substantially modified; if not, the forces of evil will regroup and continue their oppression. References to revolution suffuse the language of Chávez, of course (we are told that Christ himself is a revolutionary), and in this speech he celebrates the institutional changes that have been made over the previous 8 years in Venezuela. Yet the revolution is ongoing, with new stages always on the horizon. The first era is ending with this electoral cycle, Chávez declares later in his speech, and “another era will begin, another revolutionary era.”

The second corollary of populist discourse is what McGuire (1997), in his description of the Peronist parties in Argentina, calls an “anything goes” attitude. Procedural rights associated with liberal democracy, particularly minority rights, are seen by populists as instrumental and may be violated in order to better express the will of the people. The evil minority ceases to have legitimacy, citizenship, or possibly human rights because it has chosen to fight against the common good; any respect accorded the opposition is a generous gift rather than a moral imperative, and the populist is unlikely to show them the kinds of courtesy that one gives a worthy opponent. In this particular speech, Chávez repeatedly questions the opposition leaders’ patriotism and calls them traitors, implying that they are not true Venezuelans. The other candidates are “pipsqueaks” (*frijolitos*) who are “not just incompetent” but “irresponsible, liars, un-patriots, without any sense of honor or responsibility.” Chávez never sees his own use of government funds for the campaign as a questionable activity; instead, he asserts the government’s strict

adherence to the rules of the game and insinuates that it is the opposition that is plotting to use fraud.

Admittedly, this set of ideas lacks the precision of classic ideologies such as socialism or liberalism. It is because of this that I follow the convention of much of this literature and use the problematic term *discourse* in its largely postmodernist sense, as something that **combines elements of both ideology and rhetoric**. Populist discourse is like an ideology in that it is a set of fundamental beliefs about how the world works and tends to compel its believers into political action (for a discussion of the concept of ideology, see Gerring, 1997; Knight, 2006). But unlike an ideology, populism is a *latent* set of ideas or a worldview that lacks significant exposition and “contrast” with other discourses and is usually low on policy specifics. It has a subconscious quality that manifests itself primarily in the language of those who hold it. Hence, populists like Chávez are usually unaware that they see the political world differently from other people, and even if they are aware, they struggle to articulate those differences. A discourse is also like a rhetoric in that it is manifested in distinct linguistic forms and content that have real political consequences. But unlike common understandings of rhetoric, the ideas that constitute populist discourse **tend to be sincerely held and embodied in the language of their proponents**. In the case of populism in particular, the language is too inflammatory and too suffused with a radical notion of democracy for most people to be able to or even want to consistently pretend it; to use populist rhetoric almost certainly means that we believe in what it represents. Thus, we cannot talk as Chávez does about “confronting the Devil himself” and “our real adversary” without accepting a dualistic, teleological, conspiratorial vision of politics, nor can we identify Venezuelans who support the Bolivarian movement as “the people . . . the giant that awoke” without simultaneously believing that there can be a knowable, common good that overrides our particular interests and perspectives.

Populist discourse is likely part of a larger typology of core political discourses or worldviews that includes elitism and pluralism, although this typology has not been fully articulated in the scholarly literature. **The typology includes roughly two dimensions: (a) whether the discourse is merely a pragmatic approach to the world or a redemptive one and (b) whether it accepts or rejects fundamental democratic assumptions about the right and the ability of citizens to rule** (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004). When juxtaposed with elitism (which rejects the right and the ability of citizens to rule), populism tends to win the admiration of scholars and activists who favor democracy. This is probably one of the reasons why radical leftist critics of

liberal democracy frequently become defenders of populist regimes such as those of Chávez; they see populism as a truly democratic response to the inequalities of capitalist democracy in developing countries. In contrast, when populism (a redemptive discourse) is juxtaposed with pluralism (a pragmatic one), it makes us feel much more ambivalent. It clearly has democratic aspects—it reaffirms popular sovereignty—and typically emerges as a response to pluralist regimes that have grown ineffective and corrupt. Yet as Riker (1982) and others note, its disdain for tolerance and dissent makes it disregard the procedural norms and minority rights that protect us from the tyranny of the majority, and it can slip into totalitarianism when coupled with charismatic leaders who claim to embody the will of the people. Because the distinction between populist and pluralist discourse is the one that the literature has worked out the most thoroughly, it is the one I use to operationalize the discursive definition of populism in the following.<sup>1</sup>

### Critiquing the Discursive Definition

This article cannot provide a thorough logical defense of the discursive definition with regard to other, better known definitions of populism. Readers interested in this argument should review the work of Roxborough (1984), Knight (1998), and Laclau (2005) among others, all of which argue that the concept of discourse provides a minimal definition that potentially reveals the underlying logic of populism. Instead, the purpose of this article is to provide a more empirical or scientific defense by showing that populist discourse is measurable in ways that are valid and reliable.

Nevertheless, we need to acknowledge that a discursive approach to populism is problematic for many social scientists in the positivist tradition. First, there are epistemological concerns. Can populism or other aspects of political culture really be measured in ways that are valid, reliable, and efficient, with results that can be replicated and verified by other scholars (Barry, 1978; Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997; Little, 1991)? In other words, can a discursive concept be subjected to the rules of “valid scientific inferences” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 38)? Second, there are ontological concerns. Is populism really populism if it is spoken but never followed? Doesn't it require action in order to be important or real—some manifestation in a movement, party, or candidate that pursues power and seeks to implement policies? Finally, there is the question of real-world importance. Even if we accept discourse as a defining attribute of populism, does it matter for politics? Do different discourses actually have consequences for policy outputs and elections, namely, for the material and moral well-being of the community?

Regarding the first epistemological issue, one of the purposes of the rest of this article is of course to demonstrate that populist discourse can be measured in a way that satisfies scientific criteria. I think that readers will find this demonstration a compelling one. The answer to the second question is a little more evasive. In offering discourse as the defining attribute of populism, I am not claiming that manifestations of populism can exist without some material component. A discourse is meaningless unless believed and shared by actual human beings. However, the important point made by advocates of the discursive definition is that actions alone—raising the minimum wage, calling for a constitutional convention, repressing the opposition—are insufficient conditions for populism. Actions are ultimately “populist” because of the meaning that is ascribed to them by their participants, not because of any objective quality that inheres in them.

The third question—whether a populist discourse in the end really matters for actual politics or whether all politicians and voters respond to similar sets of preferences rooted in, say, material self-interest—is of course one of the grand theoretical questions that we struggle with as political scientists. The short answer I provide here is that this is partly an empirical problem. If we can measure populist discourse and calculate its correlation with aspects of politics and economics that interest us, then we have shown that it matters. The question then becomes the more theoretically enriching one of *how* or *why* it matters, and especially how the normative dimensions of populist discourse fit into the more familiar assumptions of material self-interest that are common to rational-choice theory. I insist, however, that we can pursue these questions without abandoning positivist methodology.

## Measuring Populist Discourse

For positivists, creating a new definition is not a very impressive feat; the real test of any concept is our ability to measure it. From this perspective, the problem with *all* definitions of populism is that they are either not applied toward measurement or they are measured in highly imprecise ways that lack standard tests of reliability and validity or descriptions of how the measurement took place. Those studies that do offer justifications are usually single-country ones that avoid demonstrating the broad applicability or reliability of their measure. Of course, discourse analysts have been particularly reluctant to apply their concepts to any kind of extensive quantitative measurement. Those who are more empirically oriented (see de la Torre, 2000; Panizza, 2005) limit



themselves to qualitative case studies or comparisons of just a few leaders, usually from the same country. Yet proponents of nondiscursive approaches to populism have been equally reluctant to provide tools for reliably measuring their own concepts. Many of them also rely on qualitative case studies, and where they do measure populism in cross-national analyses, as in those of radical right populism in Western Europe, the label of *populist* is often applied without any systematic empirical justification (see Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996; for partial exceptions, see Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2007).

Two recent studies attempt to break from this mold by offering quantitative measurements of populist discourse. Armony and Armony (2005) use a computer-based technique to measure populist discourse in a large number of speeches by two Argentine presidents. And Jagers and Walgrave (2007) perform a human-coded content analysis of television programs by six Belgian parties. Both studies find significant differences in the discourses of these leaders and parties that confirm common scholarly depictions. Yet while these reaffirm the scientific validity of the discursive approach to populism, they are still bounded in scope and have natural methodological limitations I refer to in the following. Our challenge remains finding a way of measuring the level of populism in the discourse of actual people in multiple settings, namely, across countries and across time. Doing so will not only give the discursive definition an added claim to scientific validity but will allow us to compare leaders and movements of current interest and to expand our study of the causes and consequences of populism.

In the remainder of this article, I measure populist discourse at the elite level using a form of content analysis from educational psychology known as holistic grading, which I apply to a study of more than 200 speeches from 40 chief executives. I measure elite discourse because populism is so often associated with the leaders who create and galvanize the movement—we first want to know how populist Chávez is, and only later do we ask how movement activists and ordinary voters respond to this discourse. Thus, I leave the measurement of mass discourse for a future exercise, although I refer to this challenge again in the conclusion.<sup>2</sup> I use textual analysis of speeches rather than a traditional survey technique (such as in the 2006 AmericasBarometer; see Seligson, 2007) primarily because of accessibility. It is almost impossible to survey chief executives while they are in office, let alone as large a set of chief executives as I consider here; in contrast, speeches are widely available. Textual analysis also tends to respect the culturalist origins of the concept of populist discourse. Traditional discourse analysts often object to studying what they consider a highly intersubjective concept using individually

subjective measures such as opinion surveys. A study of speeches or similar texts sidesteps this problem by considering long statements of ideas that were, potentially at least, widely communicated in a real political setting.

**Holistic grading**, unlike standard techniques of content analysis (either human coded or computer based), asks readers to interpret whole texts rather than count content at the level of words or sentences. Holistic grading is a pedagogical assessment technique that is widely used by teachers of writing and has been extensively developed by administrators of large-scale exams, principally Educational Testing Services and the Advanced Placement exams they administer for the College Board in the United States (White, 1985). Unlike analytical grading, which tries to break a text down into its parts and then combine the scores of each of those parts (as a content analysis does), a holistic approach works by assessing the overall qualities of a text and then assigning a single grade without any intervening calculations. The first step is to design a rubric, or a simplified guide for evaluating a text that identifies the rough qualities associated with different types or grades. The second step is to train a set of graders in the use of the rubric, using not only the rubric itself but also a set of sample or “anchor” texts that exemplify each type or score described in the rubric. This combination of rubric and anchor texts is the hallmark of holistic grading. Finally, the actual grading is conducted using two to three graders per text, with tests of intercoder reliability calculated along the way. Analyses of student writing that use holistic grading have been found to have high levels of intercoder reliability, with correlations typically between  $r = .70$  and  $.80$ , comparable to subjective types of human-coded content analysis. The costs are often not much greater than that of machine-coded objective exams, especially when the costs of preparing the exams are taken into account (Britton, Martin, & Rosen, 1966; Coffman, 1971; Cooper, 1977; White, 1985).<sup>3</sup> Perhaps more important for our purposes, research shows that small numbers of graders (two to three) and texts (three to four per student being assessed) have high reliability that improves only marginally with additional graders and texts (Sudweeks, Reeve, & Bradshaw, 2005).

There are two reasons for using holistic grading to measure populist discourse. First, we cannot gauge a broad, latent set of meanings in a text—a discourse—simply by counting words. Because the ideas that constitute the content of the discourse are held subconsciously and conveyed as much by the tone and style of the language as the actual words, there is no single word or phrase distinct to populist discourse or a particular location in the text where we can go to find the speaker’s “statement on the issue,” as we could using party manifestos to measure political ideology (see Budge,

Bara, Volkens, & Klingemann, 2001; Wüst & Volkens, 2003).<sup>4</sup> This means that the text must be interpreted by human coders who can quickly analyze broader, more complex patterns of meaning. Newer computer-based techniques of content analysis offer to solve this problem by generating word distributions whose broad patterns reveal something about a text (Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespín, & Radev, 2006), but in practice these require considerable interpretation of the resulting distributions. Holistic grading makes this interpretation more transparent. Second, while it is possible to use human-coded content analysis at the level of phrases or sections of text, these techniques are extremely time-consuming and unsuitable for the kind of cross-country analysis we need to generate large-*N* comparisons. In contrast, holistic grading requires no special preparation of the physical text and proceeds fairly quickly once the texts are available, and it allows us to compare texts in multiple languages without any translation so long as coders speak a common second language that they can use in their training and in reporting their results.

## The Analysis

My assistants and I began by devising a rubric that captures the core elements of populist discourse. We did so primarily by drawing on the literature on populist discourse, but also by reading the speeches of several Latin American politicians who seemed to be widely regarded as populist and comparing these with speeches of leaders who were considered more pluralist. These included speeches by Chávez and several other Latin American leaders. A copy of the rubric is found in the appendix; it essentially juxtaposes the elements of populist discourse noted earlier with their pluralist counterparts.

I next recruited and trained a set of native speakers of the languages of each country. All of these were undergraduate students at my university, many without political science background. The training familiarized the students with the discursive definition of populism and the use of the rubric, including an analysis of “anchor” speeches that exemplified different categories of populist discourse.<sup>5</sup> I then had the students perform the actual coding, which they did by reading each speech, taking notes for each of the elements of populist speech in the rubric (as a check on their work and also as a way to find relevant quotes), and assigning an overall grade. For the sake of speed and to use a more holistic approach, which requires having an anchor text for each potential grade, I had readers use a simple 3-point scale of 0 (*nonpopulist or pluralist*), 1 (*mixed*), or 2 (*populist*).

The research proceeded in two phases. In the first, we analyzed the speeches of 19 current presidents (as of fall 2005) of Latin American countries and 5 historical chief executives from the region. In a few cases where changes in power took place during the study (e.g., the election of Morales in Bolivia), we considered both chief executives. In this and the subsequent phase of the analysis, my assistants and I considered four speeches selected quasi-randomly from four categories: a campaign speech, a ribbon-cutting speech, an international speech, and a "famous" speech, typically an inaugural address or an annual report to the nation. (For comparison, I later analyze a random selection of speeches for two of these leaders.) The specific criteria for the four categories are found on the author's Web site, but the general rule was to select the most recent available speech within each category that met certain standards of length (1,000 to 3,000 words). Our purpose in using these particular four categories was to test the consistency of the discourse while ensuring that we had not overlooked key classes of speeches. We expected that the famous and campaign speeches would have a stronger populist discourse than the ribbon-cutting or international ones because they represented contexts where there were larger audiences and an appeal to the nation as a whole. The readers researched and selected the speeches themselves, most of which were available on government Web sites, and I reviewed and approved the final selections. Only two graders were used for all speeches, and each speech was read by the same two graders, both of whom spent no more than 30 to 45 minutes per speech. As will be seen later, we were able to significantly reduce this time in subsequent analyses.

In the second phase, I considered an additional 15 countries outside of Latin America. These countries were drawn from several regions, including Western and Eastern Europe, North America, Asia, and Africa, and again I considered only the current chief executive as of approximately March 2006. This phase was more challenging because it required training another 35 readers, 2 or 3 from each country. For a better check of intercoder reliability and to avoid problems of attrition, I tried to recruit 3 readers per country, although in some cases (noted in Table 2) I ended up with only 2. The analysis used the same four speech categories, selection criteria, and coding procedure as the Latin American study. All graders were again native speakers of the language and read the speeches in their original language. Readers located the speeches themselves (again, usually from government Web sites), but in this case most of the final selections were approved by two student assistants. Grading again took 30 to 45 minutes per speech.

## Reliability of the Technique

The first question is whether this technique generated data that were consistent across graders, or reliable. Because the analysis proceeded in two parts with very different sets of graders, I calculate several measures of covariation and agreement.

In the first phase of the analysis (the Latin American study), which included a total of 85 speeches each coded by the same two graders,<sup>6</sup> the level of reliability was high and gave us great confidence in the method. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two sets of scores is  $r = .79$  for all individual speeches and  $r = .87$  for the average scores for each president ( $N = 24$ ). Alternatively, because the ordinality of the grading scale is rather rough, I calculated a Spearman's rho of 0.70 for the individual speech scores, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the two coders at the  $p < .000$  level. The content analysis literature generally regards these levels of covariance as high (Neuendorf, 2002). The level of agreement, which tells us if the coders actually had the same scores rather than if they simply moved in the same direction (Tinsley & Weiss, 1975), was also quite strong. Within the data from the first phase of the analysis there was a raw 78% agreement between our two graders (that is, 78% of the time they assigned *exactly* the same grade); if we calculate agreement as any time in which the graders are within one grade of each other, then there was 100% agreement. To account for the possibility of agreement due to chance, I also calculated Cohen's kappa, a statistic that adjusts the percentage agreement by taking into account the size of the original scale and the actual observed agreement; the resulting scale ranges from 0 to 1. The kappa statistic for this first phase of the analysis was .68, a level generally regarded as substantial (StataCorp, 2003).

The level of reliability in the second phase of the analysis was not as high but was still encouraging, especially given the large number of graders, their lack of experience in political science, and the small number of speeches they each had the chance to read. We cannot calculate covariance figures for these data because I used a different set of graders for each country and often had three graders rather than two. However, we can calculate the level of agreement. If we consider agreement to be when all three readers give exactly the same grade, then we had only 70% agreement in this second phase. If we instead consider agreement to be when two readers give the same grade and a third reader differs by no more than one point, then we had 86% agreement.

**Table 1**  
**Average Populism Scores for Latin**  
**American Chief Executives**

Country	Chief Executive	Average Populism Score	Standard Deviation	Number of Speeches
Venezuela	Chávez	1.9	.25	4
Ecuador	Velasco Ibarra	1.7	.58	3
Bolivia	Morales	1.6	.71	4
Argentina	Perón	1.5	.71	4
Brazil	Vargas (I)	1.0	.54	4
Brazil	Vargas (II)	0.9	.57	4
Argentina	Menem	0.8	.50	4
El Salvador	Saca	0.6	.25	4
Mexico	L. Cárdenas	0.6	.43	4
Paraguay	Duarte	0.5	.50	3
Ecuador	Palacio	0.4	.14	3
Peru	Toledo	0.3	.29	3
Dominican Republic	Fernández	0.3	.50	4
Mexico	Fox	0.3	.50	4
Brazil	Lula	0.3	.29	4
Uruguay	Vásquez	0.3	.50	4
Argentina	Kirchner	0.2	.29	4
Costa Rica	Pacheco	0.2	.29	3
Panama	Torrijos	0.2	.29	3
Bolivia	Mesa	0.1	.25	4
Chile	Lagos	0.1	.25	4
Guatemala	Berger	0.0	.00	3
Nicaragua	Bolaños	0.0	.00	4
Honduras	Maduro	0.0	.00	3
Colombia	Uribe	0.0	.00	4
Speech category				
Campaign		0.6	.67	12
Ribbon-cutting		0.3	.48	19
International		0.4	.62	19
Famous		0.4	.62	19
Average		0.4	.60	(All categories equally weighted)

The kappa statistic for these data is .44, indicating a moderate level of agreement, although this figure is somewhat reduced by our inability to weight the calculation for the ordinal nature of the scale.

**Table 2**  
**Average Populism Scores for Non-Latin**  
**American Chief Executives**

Country	Chief Executive	Average Populism Score	Standard Deviation	Number of Speeches
Belarus	Lukashenko	1.7	.27	4
United States	Bush	1.2	.32	4
Iran	Ahmahdinejad	1.2	.58	4
Ukraine	Yushchenko <sup>a</sup>	1.1	.85	4
Philippines	Arroyo <sup>a</sup>	0.5	.41	4
Russia	Putin	0.4	.50	4
United Kingdom	Blair	0.3	.50	4
Ghana	Kufuor	0.2	.32	4
Norway	Stoltenberg	0.2	.33	4
Mongolia	Enkhbayar	0.1	.17	4
Bulgaria	Stanishev	0.1	.17	4
Canada	Harper <sup>a</sup>	0.0	.00	3
Finland	Halonen	0.0	.00	4
South Africa	Mbeki <sup>a</sup>	0.0	.00	4
Spain	Zapatero <sup>a</sup>	0.0	.00	4
Sweden	Persson	0.0	.00	4
Speech category				
Campaign		0.6	.67	15
Ribbon-cutting		0.3	.58	16
International		0.3	.52	16
Famous		0.6	.72	16
Average		0.4	.62	(All categories equally weighted)

a. Only two graders participated.

## Descriptive Results

Tables 1 and 2 present the results of these two phases of our research. The first result that readers will notice is that Chávez indeed has a very populist discourse. More important, Chávez stands together with a few other current chief executives who are often regarded as populist, such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine (at least when he first came to power), and interestingly, George Bush in the United States. These results probably fit the expectations of scholars and the public. Morales is an important ally of

Chávez and leads a popular indigenous movement for revolutionary change that has polarized the population since his election in 2005; Lukashenko has long had a strongly nationalistic outlook and a rapport with poor voters, especially in rural areas; and Yushchenko came to power at the head of a popular, prodemocracy movement, the Orange Revolution. In a moment I will explore the results for Bush.

Another important finding is that the measure of populist discourse reflects more than just the discourse of current leaders. Several key historical Latin American presidents who are usually considered populist also have a strongly populist discourse, including Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, and to a lesser degree Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. While space here prevents a full analysis, my assistants and I found that these classic populists generally incorporated all of the elements of discourse identified in our rubric. Thus, there is considerable continuity between the populists of the past and those of today, a continuity that suggests our rubric has tapped into something deep and fundamental.

Another important finding is that populist discourse is a fairly rare phenomenon. Despite recent talk of a wave of populism, we found only two clear current examples of populist discourse in Latin America as of late 2005 and early 2006 (Chávez and Morales) and potentially 3 in our sample of 15 countries outside of Latin America (Lukashenko, Bush, and Yushchenko). One of these 3 non-Latin American cases—Lukashenko—was not originally in the sample and was only included after we realized that the sample had too little variance for the causal analysis I hoped to carry out in subsequent research. If we exclude this case, then only about 1 out of every 7 leaders in either sample had a strongly populist discourse.<sup>7</sup> This may contradict popular perceptions of developing regions such as Latin America, but it fits the arguments of scholars who study the relationship of populism to democracy (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004) as well as the rough data given in the few multicountry studies of populism (Betz, 1994; Conniff, 1999; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Taggart, 1996). Populist parties and leaders are almost always present in every country, but they typically rise to prominence in moments of crisis and tend to be short-term, cyclical phenomena. If they achieve their goals, they often become routinized and lose their fervor; and if they fail to achieve their goals, they are removed from power by elitist or pluralist forces (and sometimes new populists). Even countries thought of as consistently populist, such as Argentina or Ecuador, often have nonpopulist interregnums.



Where populist discourse *is* more common in our data is precisely where we expected it: the “famous” and campaign speeches. As the data in Tables 1 and 2 indicate, these categories of speeches were nearly twice as populist as the international and ribbon-cutting speeches. This pattern manifested itself in both of our samples, although it was somewhat stronger in the non-Latin American sample.<sup>8</sup> This has special implications for the few instances where we had missing data, which in most cases was the campaign speech. The strong overall average for this category suggests that in instances of missing data, the actual average score for the leader may be a little higher.

A few of our findings are more unusual and deserve explanation. First, we find that two current leaders who are sometimes considered lukewarm populists, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina and Luís Ignácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, do not in fact have much of a populist discourse. Kirchner in particular uses a populist discourse very inconsistently. His campaign speech is the only one that is somewhat populist (graded around a 1). In this speech he frequently hints at a popular will and a notion of a romanticized common man. The speech also has a kind of Manichaeian quality that features limited cosmic proportionality and bellicosity—including brief mentions of heroes such as José de San Martín, Simón Bolívar, Mariano Moreno, and the Peróns—as well as a sense of dualism. And there is a clear set of enemies, mostly former politicians from the 1990s. However, both graders of his speeches agreed that Kirchner did not use these elements with the same consistency and power as Morales or Chávez, who frequently apply cosmic proportions to even the most mundane issues. Moreover, the discourse he used in this election is not the same as what he uses at other times; his three other speeches were all graded 0 by both readers. These other speeches lacked the bellicosity that was evident in the campaign speech and avoided references to any romanticized “will of the people” or enemy.

With Lula, it is harder to find *any* speech that is strongly populist. We focus on him more in the following, but for now I will simply point out that none of his speeches have much in the way of a Manichaeian quality. Instead, Lula tends to focus on narrow issues and avoids any kind of cosmic proportionality or the mention of historical figures. He consistently emphasizes consensus and negotiation and, while briefly criticizing some individuals or opposition groups (e.g., former president Cardoso and wealthy Brazilians), he avoids characterizing these as evil. He does make brief mention of a popular will in some of his speeches, reminding the audience of his own working-class origins and telling them that he understands their needs. Thus, his discourse is more consistent than Kirchner’s, but it is not strongly populist.

An important historical instance where we found an absence of strong populist discourse is in the speeches of Lázaro Cárdenas. Cárdenas, president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, is routinely considered a populist in older academic studies, most of which emphasize his expropriation of U.S. oil companies in 1938, his land redistribution and pro-labor policies, and his charisma (Conniff, 1999; Knight, 1998). However, Cárdenas's discourse in the speeches we examined lacks the tone and consistently populist content found in those of even his close contemporaries, such as Perón, Velasco Ibarra, and Vargas; in fact, none of his speeches ever score higher than a 1. This includes the speech he delivered shortly after the oil expropriation, which was used as his "famous" speech, as well as a much larger set of nearly 60 speeches that I analyze in the following. The breadth of our analysis in this case gives us great confidence in these findings. Of course, the accepted wisdom in this literature is generally based on nondiscursive definitions of populism, and the results we find here may reflect a bit of historical timing. Cárdenas represented a consolidated revolution, and while the speeches we examined include strong, frequent references to a General Will or romanticized people that are tinged with socialism ("the proletariat," "the workers," "complete emancipation of the people"), and a strong sense of cosmic proportions, they lack parallel references to a conspiring elite or a notion of dualism. Instead, Cárdenas emphasizes consolidating or institutionalizing the gains of the Mexican Revolution and respect for law.

The last instance where we find a noticeable absence of populism is in the speeches of Carlos Menem of Argentina, a noted "neo-populist" of the 1990s. During the decade when he was president, scholars debated whether he and a few other politicians in his generation represented a new form of populism, one relying on pro-market reforms and cross-class coalitions that included wealthy entrepreneurs (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1996). In fact, our analysis revealed that this particular leader had only a moderately populist discourse. All four of Menem's speeches utilize a kind of Manichaean discourse that frames issues as stark, morally weighty choices and that offers a bold vision for a new future for Argentina, often coupled with references to great figures and movements. For example, in the international speech he talks about "creating a new State, on solid moral foundations" and "transforming the world into something more humane," and he insists that the moment for change is "now or never." Likewise, his ribbon-cutting speech (the inauguration of a new fish cannery) waxes eloquent with references to God and the Bible and their lessons for the appropriate model of economic development. But his speeches rarely express any notion of a romanticized popular will or a conspiring elite. Thus, it may be that Menem represents a charismatic leader but not a populist one.<sup>9</sup>

One final finding that I should comment on is the high level of populist discourse in the speeches of Bush. Bush incorporates most of the elements listed in the grading rubric: He presents issues in a broad, moral, dualistic framework that ascribes cosmic proportions to his topic (“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”); he speaks about a common people that represents the good (Americans and friends of liberal democracy everywhere); and he describes a conspiring threat that embodies evil (fundamentalist Islamic terrorism). Critics of Bush would also argue that he displays a disregard for the rule of law and the accuracy of his data—an “anything goes” attitude—in defense of what he perceives to be a just cause.

That said, I suggest that it is probably not helpful to consider Bush’s discourse as populist, although it can certainly be considered as antagonistic. Bush’s discourse is not about rectifying past injustices suffered by the people at the hands of an oppressive elite. His cause is the defense against a common external enemy rather than revolution or systemic change. Nowhere in the speeches we examined does he call for radically reforming the political and economic system that governs liberal democracies and the United States. Bush has urged changing key constitutional rights and the provisions of international law in the fight against terrorism, but it is hard to imagine him ever claiming that these institutions are the product of a subversive Islamic cabal. Nor does he publicly demonize Muslims for supposedly undermining American values; instead, in the texts that we examined he reaffirms a pluralist notion of religious tolerance.

Of course, the fact that our coders failed to make this distinction suggests that our training could have been more careful. These elements of populist discourse (the need for liberation or revolution from an elite that has subverted the popular will) are stated in the rubric, but in retrospect they could have been emphasized more. This seems to have been a problem only in the larger, comparative phrase of our study where the training and experience of the graders were more condensed.

## **A Test of the Sampling Technique**

Readers may still question the small sample size (four speeches) for each chief executive. After all, perhaps the level of populism varies widely across speeches, making it necessary to have a very large sample or even making any single measurement of populism meaningless.

The variance in our results suggests that this is not a significant concern. Tables 1 and 2 include the standard deviations of the average scores for each leader. As can be seen, few if any leaders in the set have a standard deviation

**Table 3**  
**Analysis of Random Samples of Lula**  
**and Cárdenas Speeches**

	Lula		Cárdenas	
	Grader 1	Grader 2	Grader 1	Grader 2
Mean	0.48	0.64	0.32	0.20
Standard deviation	0.51	0.48	0.50	0.44
Overall mean	0.56		0.24	
Overall standard deviation	0.39		0.35	
<i>N</i>	42		60	
Percentage agreement	64.4		75.0	
Kappa	0.27		0.33	

over .50, and many have considerably lower. These figures are not very large. By comparison, a leader with average scores of 2, 2, 2, and 1—that is, with all scores identical but one—would have a standard deviation of .50, while the maximum possible standard deviation (associated with the set of scores 2, 2, 0, 0) would be 1.2. The one outlier in the sample is Yushchenko in Ukraine, with a standard deviation of .85; this result makes sense in light of the extraordinary experience that brought him to power. Thus, most leaders in the samples are fairly consistent in their use of populist discourse.

To further increase our confidence in these results, I analyzed a large, random sample of speeches by two leaders in the set, Cárdenas and Lula. I selected these presidents because their discourses were harder to measure (both were perceived as only mildly populist, somewhere between 0 and 1), thereby presenting us with a more challenging test, and because my assistants and I were reasonably certain that we had the entire universe of their speeches. We then randomly selected one speech from each month of their terms in office, 42 speeches for Lula and 60 for Cárdenas. Because of the large numbers of speeches, I asked the graders to dispense with any note taking or written analysis besides a short set of comments and a grade. This new grading technique was much faster (10 to 15 minutes per speech instead of 30 to 45 minutes). Two native Portuguese speakers and two native Spanish speakers conducted the grading.

Table 3 provides the results. In the case of Cárdenas, the level of inter-coder reliability is about as high as in previous phases of the project, with

75% absolute agreement and a kappa of .33 (the kappa is low because Cárdenas never receives above a 1, thereby generating a high level of expected agreement). In the case of Lula the level of intercoder reliability is somewhat lower. The absolute agreement is only 64% and the kappa statistic is only .27. This may be a result of having to grade “in-between” speeches using a 3-point ordinal scale. Our graders indicated afterward that many of Lula’s speeches were “right between a 0 and a 1” (hence the average scores of around .50), a pattern that forced them to make many hard decisions. The fact that the average scores of each grader across the entire Lula sample were almost indistinguishable from each other suggests that the lack of agreement was not a problem of bias or inadequate training but of small differences in judgment magnified by the scale.<sup>10</sup> In future rounds of analysis we may want to try a more continuous scale.

The more specific question, however, is whether these results show that we were justified in using a small sample in our two previous phases. One indicator of the robustness of our sampling criteria is whether the average scores for Lula and Cárdenas from the first phase of our project were close to the average scores from the new analysis. Indeed, the actual differences between these two phases are not very large, only about .31 in the case of Lula and .32 in the case of Cárdenas, differences that are significant at only the  $p < .12$  level and  $p < .23$  level, respectively ( $t$  test with unequal variance). Given the fact that we used different sampling criteria in these two different phases (one a nonrandom sample from four speech categories that took context into account, the other a random sample from all available speeches), these similarities are actually quite striking. Again, they suggest remarkable continuity in each leader’s discourse.

The other important indicator of the effectiveness of our sampling criteria is the size of the variance in our data and especially the difference in variances across the samples. If the larger, random sample yields a dramatic change in the variance of our estimates, we may not be justified in relying on such small samples in the first phases of the analysis. As it turns out, the variances of these two samples are nearly identical and not very large. In the original analysis, the four scores for Lula had a standard deviation of .29 and those for Cárdenas had a standard deviation of .35, while in the second, larger samples, the standard deviations are only .36 and .43, respectively. Using the Levene test for difference in variance, the difference between the earlier and later standard deviations is not significant by common standards for either president ( $p < .71$  for Lula and  $p < .69$  for Cárdenas).<sup>11</sup>

## Conclusion

In this article I have enhanced our understanding of populism by presenting a technique for measuring populist discourse. After laying out the discursive definition in the context of other approaches to populism, I measure populist discourse quantitatively across a broad sample of leaders from different countries and times. I do this by holistically analyzing samples of speeches of chief executives. This novel technique produces meaningful results with reasonable face validity and moderate or high reliability, even with small sample sizes. It shows a small percentage of highly populist leaders today (including Chávez) and finds that their discourses are very similar to well-known populists from the past. This implies that populism defined as discourse is a reasonably coherent and consistent phenomenon that we cannot brush aside for methodological reasons. The burden is now on critics to clarify their definitions and apply them to similar empirical tests.

This technique is fairly efficient in comparison with other standard techniques of textual analysis. Although initial runs of the exercise took 30 to 45 minutes per speech, the later version using a random sample of speeches required only 10 to 15 minutes. These are respectable times for human-coded content analysis. When we consider that the exercise naturally incorporated the interpretation of the text into the measurement process, these times even begin to compare favorably with some of the newer computer-coded content analyses, which leave most of the interpretation for afterward and incorporate fewer checks of reliability into this stage.

The article has bracketed the question of mass-level reception or recreation of elite populist discourse, that is, whether activists and voters actually respond to the discourse or if perhaps they follow populist leaders for other reasons. However, the results here have implications for mass-level analysis and measurement. Currently, mass-level texts comparable to political speeches are not readily available, making surveys one of our best alternatives. Survey research typically shows a preference for short, precise, closed-ended questions because of concerns about coding (especially cost) and the reliability of results. However, the use of holistic grading here suggests that we can make use of longer answers to questionnaires. Surveys that hope to gauge such broad, latent cultural phenomenon as political discourse might include questions soliciting a long, recorded response rather than trying to break the discourse down into its constituent

elements and measuring these separately. The text can still be graded efficiently and is more likely to generate valid results.

The analysis has implications not only for the study of populism but for the broader study of culture in comparative politics. Political scientists have long used surveys and content analysis to gauge the presence of certain ideas in the minds of politicians and voters, but we have yet to face challenging concepts such as political discourse that reflect intersubjective views of culture. The method I have used here—holistic grading—is one that tries to be faithful to the theoretical insights and ontological assumptions of the interpretivist approach while still maintaining positivist standards of measurement. Traditional discourse analysts may or may not be happy with these results. After all, this is still an attempt to quantify what some may see as unquantifiable, and it glosses over important qualitative distinctions that we can only see by closely analyzing particular speeches. My point in this analysis is not to discredit qualitative techniques but to complement them with quantitative ones that can enhance our understanding while still respecting culturalist insights.

## Appendix Populist Speech Rubric

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**Name of politician:**

**Title of Speech:**

**Category:**

**Grader:**

**Date of grading:**

**Final Grade (delete unused grades):**

2 = A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse and has few elements that would be considered nonpopulist.

1 = A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including nonpopulist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will but avoid bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

0 = A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements.

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*(continued)*

## Appendix (continued)

Populist	Pluralist
<p>It conveys a Manichaeian vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, “right” or “wrong,” “good” or “evil”). The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence sitting, no shades of gray. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.</p>	<p>The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black and white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on <b>narrow, particular issues</b>. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.</p>
<p>The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing <b>cosmic proportions</b> to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of “history.” At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to <b>national and religious leaders</b> that are generally revered.</p>	<p>The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.</p>
<p>Although Manichaeian, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the “voluntad del pueblo;” however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50% of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.</p>	<p>Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable “will.” The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.</p>
<p>The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the “oligarchy;” but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States; or the capitalist, industrialized nations; or international financiers; or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.</p>	<p>The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.</p>

*(continued)*



## Appendix (continued)

Populist	Pluralist
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as “revolution” or “liberation” of the people from their “immiseration” or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of “differences” rather than “hegemony.”
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, nondemocratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority’s continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity toward the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.
<b>Overall Comments (just a few sentences):</b>	

### Notes

1. That this typology is incomplete can be seen in the fact that it is threefold, while the existence of two dimensions suggests something fourfold. Elitism seems to be the problematic type, in that it fails to distinguish between redemptive and pragmatic nondemocratic discourses.

2. The fact that a populist leader has a large popular following does not necessarily mean that activists and voters are populist. As de la Torre (2007) points out, citizens may follow populists to send a message to traditional politicians because of material inducements or simply because the politician is entertaining.

3. Psychometricians now generally acknowledge the inadequacy of correlations coefficients for measuring intercoder reliability as they fail to indicate actual agreement (Ebel, 1951; Tinsley & Weiss, 1975). Consequently, recent studies make use of much more sophisticated techniques for assessing reliability of holistic testing while finding similar, positive results (cf. Sudweeks, Reeve, & Bradshaw, 2005).

4. We found this out early in the analysis when we attempted to measure populism using a standard content analysis; no single word or sentence ever conveyed the broader set of meanings.

5. The anchor texts included an international speech by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (generally graded a 2 by the readers), an international speech by Evo Morales of Bolivia (also generally graded a 2), a campaign speech by James Harper of Canada (graded a 1), and an international speech by Tony Blair (graded a 0). Of course, none of these anchor texts were included in the subsequent analysis.

6. While 92 Latin American speeches were coded in the first phases of the analysis, as indicated in Table 1, some of these were speeches by Brazilian presidents that were coded by other readers in the second phase.

7. The Latin American sample is almost the entire universe of cases in this region, and this overall result should be seen as representative. To choose cases for the second, non-Latin American sample, we used a decision rule that seems unlikely to be correlated with populism, namely, we considered countries for which a sizeable population of undergraduate students was available to work as readers at my university. Thus, the overall descriptive results here may be representative as well.

8. If we consider the two samples separately, the difference between the campaign speeches and either the ribbon-cutting or international speeches is statistically significant at the  $p < .05$  to  $p < .10$  level in both samples (one-tailed test); however, the difference between the famous speeches and either the ribbon-cutting or international speeches is generally not significant.

9. This confirms the characterization of Menem's discourse by Novaro (1998), who argues that Menem's notion of the people was more inclusive than that of Perón. It may also substantiate some of the qualifications of the concept of neopopulism subsequently made by Weyland (2001).

10. Although the difference in means is statistically significant for Lula, with a  $t$  test of  $p < .09$ , the actual difference between the two graders in this phase is only .16. Similar results prevail with the Cárdenas analysis, where a  $t$  test is significant at the  $p < .07$  level but the actual difference is only .12.

11. Because the distributions of scores are not symmetric, the Levene test is calculated using the median in place of the mean.

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